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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE phrase "tax expenditures" was not used until 1967 in a
speech by Stanley Surrey.' Special tax incentives for particu-
lar types of economic activity, however, have been part of the
United States income tax system since its inception in 1913.2 Tax
expenditures are revenue losses arising from provisions of the
federal tax laws that allow a special exclusion, exemption or de-
duction from gross income or that provide a special credit, a pref-
erential rate of tax or a deferral of tax liabilityA These special
provisions are not necessary to implement the income tax struc-
ture itself but are instead government expenditures made
through the tax system, hence the name "tax expenditures. ' 4
The prevailing opinion among academic tax lawyers, Treasury of-
ficials and tax economists is that the tax system is a poor vehicle
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The author gratefully acknowledges
the research assistance provided by James Jones, while a student at Seton Hall
University School of Law and summer research support provided by Seton Hall
University School of Law.
1. In 1967, Stanley Surrey was Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in the
Treasury Department. Assistant Secretary Surrey conducted the research that
provided a "Tax Expenditure Budget," published in the Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Treasury in 1968. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX RE-
FORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES Vii (1973).
2. Richard Goode, Lessons from Seven Decades of Income Taxation, in OPTIONS
FOR TAX REFORMS 13, 20 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1984). The deduction for
home mortgage interest has been in the law since 1913. Id. at 20. In addition,
the deduction for non-business taxes and the exclusion for interest on state and
local securities dates back to the original tax act. Id. In 1917, Congress enacted
the deduction for charitable contributions to encourage taxpayers to make chari-
table donations. Id. at 21. Congress was concerned that the recent tax increases
necessary to finance World War I would cause a decrease in the level of charita-
ble contributions. Id. Therefore, the charitable contribution deduction was one
of the first important examples of a deliberate incentive program legislated by
Congress. Id. at 20.
3. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-344, § 3(a)(3), 88 Stat. 297, 299 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (1988)).
4. SURREY, supra note 1, at vii. In essence, such special provisions are
viewed as a means of providing governmental financial assistance and have a
purpose similar to direct expenditures. Id. Tax expenditures in the income tax
system have a wide ranging and significant impact on individual and corporate
taxpayers. Id. at 50. Individual taxpayers are affected as consumers, wage earn-
ers, investors or recipients of benefits under income transfer programs. Id. Ex-
amples of tax expenditure provisions available to individual taxpayers include:
(1) the exclusion of employer pension contributions from employee wages; (2)
the interest deduction for home mortgages; and (3) the retirement income tax
credit. Id. at 13, 93-97.
Corporations have also benefitted greatly from tax expenditures. Id. at 77.
Although some tax expenditures are geared toward specialized industries, many
other special provisions affect corporations in general such as accelerated depre-
ciation deductions for fixed assets. Id. at 78.
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for social policy. 5 Nonetheless, virtually all industrialized coun-
tries make use of tax expenditures as a substitute for government
spending programs otherwise known as direct expenditures. 6
The reasons for the widespread use of tax expenditures are
varied. According to Professor Aaron, the popularity of tax ex-
penditures "derives from a peculiar alliance among conservatives,
who find attractive the alleged reduction in the role of govern-
ment that would follow from extensive use of tax credits, and lib-
erals anxious to solve social and economic problems-by
whatever means-before it is too late."17 Proponents of tax ex-
penditures maintain that such incentives encourage the private
sector to participate in social programs because the "most conve-
nient form for subsidizing a businessman is through his income
tax." 8 And for some, the thought of only using the tax system for
raising revenue is "just antediluvian. "9 Finally, at least with re-
5. See id. at 146 (arguing that many tax incentive provisions relate to pro-
grams that are essentially experimental in nature and as result are inappropriate
for establishing social policy); see also Richard L., Doernberg, A Workable Flat Rate
Consumption Tax, 70 IOWA L. REV. 425, 425 (1985) (describing current tax law as
having weighted down nation's economy "with a hodgepodge of inefficient, dis-
tortive provisions"); Donald C. Lubick, The Treasury Department and Tax Legisla-
tion, in TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES 11, 14 (Colvin ed., 1980) (discussing
proliferation of tax expenditures as leading to complexities in administering tax
law); Bernard Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of Science, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 171, 184 (1965) (observing that support for science through tax subsidies is
often wasteful and inefficient method of funding). But see Edward A. Zelinsky,
Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973,
975-76 (1986) (arguing that tax expenditures can be more efficient than direct
expenditures because of lower transactional costs).
6. See INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 9 (Paul R. McDaniel & Stanley S. Surrey eds., 1985) (citing Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and West Germany-prior to its unification
with East Germany-as examples of industrialized countries that employ tax ex-
penditure provisions).
7. See SURREY, supra note 1, at 147 (citing HenryJ. Aaron, Tax Exemptions -
The Artful Dodge, TRANSACTION, March 1969, at 5). Certainly a tax expenditure
program can be designed to have little government bureaucracy, as can a direct
spending program. But this is not true of the low-income housing credit where,
with respect to particular provisions, the state housing credit agencies, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
must supervise various aspects of the program.
8. 115 CONG. REC. 12,875-77 (1969) (statement of Senator Charles Percy in
support of S. 2192, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), a bill that provided tax incen-
tive for manpower-training and employment); see also Zelinsky, supra note 5, at
1011 (arguing that "[c]ommunication through the tax system is frequently the
government's cheapest method of conveying its policies, particularly in the case
of small businesses and middle-income taxpayers").
9. CHARLES 0. GALVIN & BORIS I. BrrTrKER, THE INCOME TAX: How PRO-
GRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? 108-09 (1969) (citing Paul Treusch, President-elect,
Federal Bar Association).
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spect to the United States, the budget process and the committee
system within Congress promote use of the tax system.' 0 Unlike
other congressional committees, the tax-writing committees (the
Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee) are able both to authorize a particular program and ap-
propriate the necessary funds through a reduction in revenue
receipts. Thus, a tax expenditure program bypasses the normal
two committee process. I I The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
(BEA) 12 exacerbates this procedural advantage because the tax-
writing committees can pay for any new social programs,
designed as tax expenditures, with either tax increases or spend-
ing cuts.' 3 The appropriations committees, on the other hand,
have only one option-to cut spending. 14
The low-income housing credit is a contemporary example of
a government program implemented through the tax code. To
increase the stock of affordable housing without appropriating
public funds directly for that purpose, Congress decided to give
the private sector a tax incentive to build and renovate low-in-
come rental housing. This Article focuses on the debate over the
low-income housing credit to illustrate the problems inherent in
using the tax code to implement social policy. Proposed low-in-
10. Usually, Congress must take two steps before the federal government
can spend money on an activity. STANLEY E. COLLENDER, THE GUIDE TO THE
FEDERAL BUDGET FISCAL 1993 1 (1992) [hereinafter FEDERAL BUDGET FISCAL
1993]. First, an authorization, substantive legislation establishing guidelines for
a given activity, must be passed. Id. Second, an appropriation must be passed to
enable an agency to spend money. Id. Both an authorization and an appropria-
tion are necessary for an activity to be included in the budget because a program
must be allowed to exist and money must be provided for its implementation.
Id.
The reasons for this dual requirement are mostly political. The two-step
authorizations/appropriations procedure separates program decision-making
from financial decision-making within Congress. Thus, the rules purport to limit
the Appropriations Committees to financial issues while barring them from sub-
stantive policy in order to prevent an excessive concentration of legislative
power. ALLEN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING, AND TAX-
ING 170 (1980).
11. SURREY, supra note 1, at 145. In addition, members of Congress can
most effectively accomplish their legislative goals through the committees on
which they serve. Thus, the members of the tax-writing committees have strong
incentives to use the tax code for their social policy initiatives. See SCHICK, supra
note 10, at 504 (observing that tax legislation provides Congress with opportu-
nity to provide benefits to political interest groups).
12. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990), Pub. L. No.
101-508, Title XIII, 104 Stat. 1388-573.
13. Id.
14. Id. For a discussion of sequestration procedures and spending limits,
see infra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
874 [Vol. 38: p. 871
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come housing credit legislation attempted to address housing
policy issues in the tax code and found itself in apparent conflict
with tax policy considerations. Part II of this Article examines
two housing policy goals that appear to conflict with tax policy
goals, determines that these conflicts are real and discusses how
to resolve the conflicts between tax policy and social policy goals.
First, the use of below-market purchase options to facilitate
the transfer of credit properties to organizations dedicated to the
provision of low-income housing appears to conflict with the tax
policy goal of limiting tax benefits to the "true owner" of the
property. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Act of 198915
proposed to allow nonprofit organizations and tenant coopera-
tives to negotiate below-market purchase options with the inves-
tors during a project's initial development without disqualifying
the investors from claiming the credit while they own the prop-
erty.' 6 Because an owner who grants a below-market purchase
option has no right to appreciation, Congress maintained that
this owner has relinquished one of the benefits of ownership.
With ownership at issue, the grant of a below-market purchase
option would justify depriving the investors of tax benefits such as
depreciation deductions and the tax credit. This tax policy con-
cern-that the below-market purchase option removed any rea-
sonable expectation of deriving a profit independent of tax
benefits-made this proposed modification unacceptable to Con-
gress. This Article discusses the inappropriateness of this tax pol-
icy principle in the context of the low-income housing credit.
Second, the goal of encouraging investment in low-income
housing appears to conflict with the tax policy goal of ensuring
that the wealthy pay an equitable amount of taxes; a maxim
known as vertical equity. 17 The Community Revitalization Tax
Act of 1989i8 proposed to increase the pool of investors eligible
to use the low-income housing credit by modifying the passive
15. S. 980, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter S. 980].
16. Id. § 2.
17. Vertical equity refers to the relative amount of taxes paid by taxpayers
with different incomes and requires that those with greater ability to pay actually
pay more tax. This maxim-that as one's income rises the proportion of income
that one pays as a tax rises-is one of the justifications for the progressive rate
structure of the United States income tax system. MICHAELJ. GRAETZ, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 17 (1988); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 19 (1993). See generally WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY
KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 3 (1953) (analyzing
progressive taxation).
18. S. 342, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter S. 342].
1993] 875
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activity rules in order to limit their scope to include only losses,
not credits.' 9 Congress maintained that this proposed modifica-
tion to the passive activity rules would undermine the equity of
the tax code. Using tax expenditure analysis, this Article asserts
that allowing wealthy taxpayers to receive the benefit of the low-
income housing credit does not conflict with the goal of vertical
equity if the tax credit is fully capitalized 20 or, in the alternative, is
treated properly for income measurement purposes. 2'
Although the larger debate focuses on the propriety of fed-
eral intervention in the domestic economy 22 and the use of the
tax system to accomplish such intervention, 23 this Article neces-
sarily assumes that Congress has affirmatively chosen to intervene
in the economy through the tax system. An evaluation of the eco-
nomic efficiency and the political and moral implications of this
choice is beyond the scope of this Article. 24 Rather, this Article
seeks a reevaluation of tax policy principles when the tax code is
being used solely to accomplish social policy goals. The low-in-
come housing credit example illustrates why tax policy concerns
should not frustrate congressional intent in accomplishing social
policy objectives.
19. Id. § 2.
20. For a discussion of why a capitalized tax credit does not violate vertical
equity, see infra notes 237-46 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of remedying inequities in both direct expenditures
and tax expenditures, see infra notes 217-36 and accompanying text.
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY,
AND GROWTH (1984) [hereinafter TAX REPORT], reprinted in FEDERAL TAXES BUL-
LETIN 51 (1984) (containing "Volume 1 - Overview") (asserting that income tax
system interferes with economic choices and retards saving, investment and
growth). The Tax Report advocates a tax policy of non-intervention in the do-
mestic economy. Id. It asserts that because the tax system has expanded beyond
its primary purpose of raising revenue to subsidizing a long list of economic
activities through exclusions, deductions, tax credits and preferential tax rates,
the tax system has become too complicated, unfair and intrusive. Id.
23. For articles examining the debate over the use of tax expenditures in
lieu of direct expenditure programs, see Doernberg, supra note 5, at 425; Lubick,
supra note 5, at 11, 14; Wolfman, supra note 5, at 184; Zelinsky, supra note 5, at
975-76; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF THE Low-
INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT COMPARED WITH HOUSING VOUCHERS: A CBO
STAFF MEMORANDUM, reprinted in 56 TAX NOTES 493 (1992) [hereinafter CBO]
(discussing use of low-income housing credit as compared to housing vouchers
as method to provide low-income housing for poor).
24. For a thorough discussion of the efficiency of tax incentives in terms of
"universal market efficiency," "sectoral efficiency" and "technical efficiency,"
see Zelinsky, supra note 5.
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A. Purpose of the Low-Income Housing Credit
The low-income housing credit provides an incentive for the
private sector to build and renovate low-income rental housing.
The goal is to increase the affordable housing stock available to
low-income tenants. In exchange for reducing the rent that they
charge qualified low-income tenants, the owners receive a tax
credit designed in part as compensation for rent reduction.2 5 Us-
ing the tax credit for this purpose creates a partnership between
the federal government and the private sector concerning the
provision of affordable housing. Absent the tax credit or other
government subsidy, the private sector has little economic incen-
tive to provide low-income housing. The investment itself pro-
vides an inadequate return because low-income housing does not
usually appreciate in value and rental income is limited. 26
Until 1974, most federal housing activities were structured as
new construction programs. Public housing projects were ini-
tially built, owned and operated by state-chartered, local public
housing authorities using federal monies to finance development
costs. 27 In the 1960s, however, Congress decided that it was
more efficient for the private sector to use government subsidies
to build, own and operate this housing than it was for the govern-
ment to undertake such activities itself.28 With the decline in fed-
25. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 758-59 (1986) [hereinafter S.
REP. No. 313]. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIIrS 3.3.3 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing difficulties of de-
termining who ultimately benefits from tax expenditures or incentives). For a
discussion of the history of the low-income housing credit, see infra notes 61-72
and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of certain economic realities in low-income housing,
see infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. Senator William S. Cohen stated
that "[it is precisely because the economics of low-income housing are so unat-
tractive that the Congress has, since 1949, encouraged the goal of low-income
housing for poor people through direct spending programs and tax incentives."
132 CONG. REC. S8152 (daily ed. June 23, 1986) (statement of Sen. Cohen); see
also Sharon Hom, Does Real Estate Syndication Provide a Viable Financing Strategy for
Low Income Housing?, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 913, 915 (1984) (noting that market-
place, without government involvement, has not been viable mechanism for de-
velopment of low-income housing).
27. GRACE MILGRAM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HOUSING POLICY:
Low- AND MODERATE-INCOME, CRS ISSUE BRIEF, CRS-3 (Aug. 2, 1990).
28. Section 901 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 "de-
clares that it is the policy of the United States to encourage the widest possible
participation by private enterprise in the provision of housing for low or moder-
ate income families." Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-448, § 901, 82 Stat. 476, 547. Consequently, the Act of 1968 added
§ 236 to the National Housing Act and contemplated the formation of partner-
ships as the vehicle for the participation of private investors in the provision of
affordable housing. Id. at 498, 549.
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eral spending on housing during the Reagan era, the low-income
housing credit became and remains the largest federally funded
program encouraging new construction and rehabilitation of low-
income housing.2 9 Even among all existing housing programs,
the low-income housing credit is substantial. For example, the
tax expenditure on low-income housing credits was $0.6 billion in
1991, compared with $1 billion spent on housing vouchers.30
B. Structure of the Low-Income Housing Credit
The low-income housing credit may be claimed annually,
generally over a ten-year period, by an owner of a qualified resi-
dential rental project beginning with the taxable year in which the
building is placed in service.3' Most of the tax credit units pro-
duced to date have been assembled by for-profit developers who
typically sell shares in the project to one or more outside inves-
tors, either through large public offerings or private placements
and other partnership arrangements.32 Newly constructed build-
ings, certain rehabilitation expenditures that are treated as a sep-
arate new building and newly acquired existing structures if
substantially rehabilitated are eligible for the credit.3 3 The low-
income housing credit is available only on rent-restricted units
that are leased to qualifying low-income tenants.3 4 A qualified
29. HERBERT STEVENS & THOMAS TRACY, A DEVELOPER'S GUIDE TO THE Low
INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT I-II (1992); see also Kim Hopper & Jill Hamburg,
The Making of America's Homeless: From Skid Row to New Poor, 1945-1984, in CRITI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 25-32 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986) (main-
taining that federal neglect towards nation's housing crisis during 1970s and
1980s is evidenced by rapid increase in homelessness, surge in unemployment,
sharp decline in social spending by federal government and alarming scarcity of
affordable housing). Initially, Congress authorized the low-income housing tax
credit on a temporary basis only. STEVENS & TRACY, supra, at II. With passage of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, however, Congress has rein-
stated the low-income housing credit on a permanent basis. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993), Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13142(a), 107
Stat. 437, 438; see also Tax Portion of OBRA '93 Generally Increases Taxes, 79J. TAX'N
130, 131-32 (1993)..
30. CBO, supra note 23, at 494. With the permanent extension of the low-
income housing credit in 1993, the tax expenditure related to the credit will be
$4.864 billion for the years 1994-1998. JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, ESTI-
MATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2264 3 (JCX-I 1-
93).
31. I.R.C. § 42(0(1) (CCH 1993).
32. ICF INCORPORATED, EVALUATION OF THE Low-INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT 4-14 (1991) [hereinafter ICF STUDY]. Non-syndicated projects or sole
proprietorships account for only about 14 percent of all tax credit units. Id.
33. I.R.C. § 42(d)-(e) (CCH 1993).
34. I.R.C. § 42(g)(l)-( 2 ) (CCH 1993). Gross rent is restricted to 30% of
the imputed income limitation, which is determined by assuming a family size
[Vol. 38: p. 871
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residential rental project must remain as rental property with a
minimum number of rent-restricted units throughout a fifteen-
year period. 35 The credit is recaptured with interest from all
owners if the project fails to comply with the rent limits and set-
aside requirements during this compliance period or from any
owner who sells his interest in the project.3 6
For any project allocated the tax credit after 1989, the owner
must agree to provide low-income units for at least thirty years. 37
Under some conditions, however, an owner may terminate this
commitment after fifteen years. 38 First, the owner may sell the
project at any price if the buyer agrees to abide by the tenant in-
come-and-rent limitations for an additional fifteen years. 39 If no
such buyer is found, the owner must notify the housing agency of
its intention to sell the building or convert it to higher-income
units.40 The housing credit agency then has one year to find a
equivalent to 1.5 times the number of bedrooms in the housing unit. I.R.C.
§ 42(g)(2). For further discussion concerning the gross rent restriction and the
requirements that must be satisfied for rental projects to qualify for the low-
income housing tax credit, see infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
35. I.R.C. § 42(i)(1) (CCH 1993). For a discussion of the minimum number
of rent-restricted units required in each building, see infra note 43 and accompa-
nying text.
36. I.R.C. § 42(j) (CCH 1993). The percentage of the credit recaptured
phases out in the 11 th through the 15th year. CBO, supra note 23, at 494. Gen-
erally, recapture can occur when there is a change in the ownership of a building
or a partnership interest. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-96
(1986). However, if there are more than 35 partners in the partnership, the
partnership is treated as the owner of the project for purposes of recapture, and
no recapture of the credit will occur unless transfers within a 12-month period
are in excess of 50% in value of the total partnership interests. I.R.C.
§ 42(j)(5); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra, at 11-96.
Otherwise, to avoid recapture, the owner selling the building or the part-
nership interest may post a bond in an amount that satisfies the IRS, if it is
reasonably expected that the building will be operated as a qualified low-income
building for the rest of the compliance period. I.R.C. § 42(j)(6)(A)-(B). Reve-
nue Ruling 90-60 provides guidance on how to post the bond that must be main-
tained throughout the compliance period plus 58 months after the end of the
compliance period. Rev. Rul. 90-60, 1990-2 C.B. 4, modified Rev. Rul. 90-67,
1990-2 C.B. 4. The Revenue Ruling provides percentage factor amounts to be
applied to calculate the amount of the bond that must be posted. Id.
37. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6) (CCH 1993). This extended low-income housing
commitment is an agreement with respect to the property, recorded pursuant to
state law as a restrictive covenant, that requires the appropriate percentage of
the building to remain available as rent-restricted units for low-income occu-
pancy. Individuals who meet the income limitation applicable to the building
(whether prospective, present or former occupants) have the right to enforce
this agreement in state court.
38. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(E).
39. CBO, supra note 23, at 494; see also I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(B) (CCH 1993).
40. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(E) (CCH 1993).
9
Kaye: Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
880 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 871
willing buyer at a formula price that is generally equal to the out-
standing balance on secured indebtedness, plus the investors' eq-
uity contributions, increased annually by the consumer price
index (CPI)-not to exceed five percent per year.4 1 Finally, if the
agency is unable to find a suitable buyer, the owner is free to sell
or convert the project subject to the limitation that existing ten-
ants cannot be evicted without cause for three years. 42
Residential rental projects qualify for the tax credit only if 1)
twenty percent or more of the units are occupied by individuals
with incomes that are no more than fifty percent of area median
income, as adjusted for family size, or 2) forty percent or more of
the units are occupied by individuals with incomes that are no
more than sixty percent of area median income, as adjusted for
family size. 43 Regardless of which condition is satisfied, the gross
rent paid by a family in a low-income unit may not exceed thirty
percent of the imputed income limitation that is determined by
assuming a family size equal to 1.5 times the number of bedrooms
in the unit. 44
The Treasury sets the credit rate so that the annual credit
amounts generate a stream of benefits with a net present value of
either seventy percent or thirty percent of the basis attributable to
qualifying low-income units.45 The applicable percentage de-
41. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(F).
42. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(E)(ii); see also CBO, supra note 23, at 494 (noting that
low-income units can be converted to another use if state housing agency cannot
find buyer, but low-income tenants must be permitted to remain with restricted
rents for three years).
43. I.R.C. § 42(g)(1) (CCH 1993).
44. I.R.C. § 4 2(g)(2). For this purpose, efficiency units are treated as being
occupied by one person and all other units are treated as being occupied by 1.5
persons for each separate bedroom. I.R.C. § 42(g)(2)(C). So for the purpose of
determining rent levels, a two bedroom unit is treated as if occupied by three
persons. Because the income qualification for a three person household is 54
percent of area median income in a "40/60" project, rent for a two bedroom
unit would equal 30% of 54% of the area median income. The area median
income figures to be used are those published by HUD each year, under § 8 of
the United States Housing Act of 1937 § 2 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1437
et seq. (Supp. 11 1990). I.R.S. Notice 88-80, 1988-2 C.B. 396; see also STEVENS &
TRACY, supra note 29, at 25 (noting that area median income figures to be used
are published by HUD each year and are listed on state-by-state basis). For low-
income buildings placed in service prior to 1990, the maximum allowable rent
was determined on the basis of the actual family size of the occupants. The 1993
Act allows owners of such buildings to make an irrevocable election to use apart-
ment size in determining maximum allowable rent. OBRA 1993 § 13142(c), 107
Stat. at 439.
45. The Treasury's monthly adjustments of the credit percentage are to be
determined on a discounted after-tax basis, based on the average of the annual
applicable federal rates (AFR) for mid-term and long-term obligations for the
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss4/1
1993] THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING CREDIT 881
pends on the type of low-income housing expenditure. 46 For
September 1992, the credit rate was set at 8.55% for seventy per-
cent present value property and 3.66% for thirty percent present
value property.47 A taxpayer's credit amount in any taxable year
is computed by applying the appropriate credit percentage 48 to
the proportion of the eligible basis in a qualified low-income
building that is attributable to the low-income rental units.49 The
eligible basis of a new building is its adjusted basis, which in-
cludes construction costs and other costs for depreciable prop-
erty attributable to the building.50 The cost of land, market rate
units, syndication and financing are not eligible for the credit.
Generally, any building eligible for the credit must receive an
allocation of credit authority from the state or local housing
credit agency5' where the qualifying low-income housing project
is located. 52 Each state has a limited amount of credits that can be
month the building is placed in service. For example, the initial 70% present
value credit of nine percent was determined as follows: (.70 X .0585)/[1.0585 -
1/(1.0585)9 = .0892 where the after-tax interest rate equaled 5.85%. STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 154-55 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter BLUEBOOK].
The after-tax interest rate is to be computed as the product of 1) the aver-
age AFR, and 2) one minus the maximum individual statutory federal income tax
rate. The discounting formula assumes each credit is received on the last day of
each year and that the present value is to be computed as of the last day of the
first year. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 36, at 11-88.
46. The reduced credit is available for certain subsidized housing and the
purchase cost of existing housing that is rehabilitated. I.R.C. § 42(b)(2)(B)
(CCH 1993).
47. Rev. Rul. 92-67, 1992-2 C.B. 208.
48. I.R.C. § 42(b)(1)(A)-(B) (CCH 1993).
49. I.R.C. § 42(d); BLUEBOOK, supra note 45, at 154.
50. BLUEBOOK, supra note 45, at 157. Eligible basis of existing buildings
consists of: (1) building rehabilitation costs; and (2) purchase cost of existing
buildings acquired. Id. The cost of land, however, is not included in the calcula-
tion of eligible or adjusted basis. Id. In general, eligible basis is established at
the time the building is placed into service. Id. Similarly, with regard to rehabil-
itation expenditures made on an existing building that was recently purchased,
capital expenditures incurred during the first year of the credit period can be
included in eligible basis. Id.
51. Projects financed with the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds subject to the
state volume cap under § 146 are not required to receive an allocation of credit
authority from the appropriate state or local housing credit agency. I.R.C.
§ 42(h)(4) (CCH 1993); see also BLUEBOOK, supra note 45, at 167 (noting that
exemption from mandatory allocation requirement is provided for buildings fi-
nanced with proceeds of tax-exempt bonds). However, the project must still
satisfy the requirements for allocation of a housing credit under the qualified
allocation plan applicable to the area in which the project is located. I.R.C.
§ 42(m)(1)(D).
52. I.R.C. § 42(h)(1) (CCH 1993); see BLUEBOOK, supra note 45, at 167 (ob-
serving that developers of building eligible for low-income housing credits must
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allocated in any one given year. The annual credit limitation for a
state is equal to $1.25 multiplied by the number of residents in
the state.53 Thus, a state with a population of ten million people
has an annual credit limitation of $12.5 million. The state's total
actual credit limitation also includes any unallocated credits from
the prior year and any credits previously allocated but returned
by a project.54 Nationally, the new credit allocation authority for
1992 was $315.2 million.55
The credit is subject to the rules of the general business
credit and is not allowed against the alternative minimum tax.56
With respect to the passive activity rules, the credit (but not a
loss) is treated as arising from rental real estate activities in which
the taxpayer actively participates. This means that the credit is
eligible for special treatment when applying the passive activity
rules and may be used to offset tax on up to $25,000 of nonpas-
sive income.57 Currently, for depreciation purposes, the basis of
low-income housing property is not reduced by the amount of
reserve allocation of credit authority from state or local agency in jurisdiction
where project is located).
53. I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(C)(i) (CCH 1993). Ten percent of this figure ($0.125
per resident), however, is set aside for exclusive use by qualified nonprofit orga-
nizations. I.R.C. § 42(h)(5)(A).
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989 had extended the low-income
housing credit for one year but with only an equivalent of nine months worth of
credit ($0.9375 per resident). Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA
1989), Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7108(a)(2), 103 Stat. 2106, 2306. OBRA 1990
extended the credit through 1991 and restored the credit to $1.25 per resident
for 1990. OBRA 1990 § 11406, 104 Stat. at 1388-474. The Tax Extension Act
of 1991 extended the credit throughJune 30, 1992, again at $1.25 per resident.
Tax Extension Act of 1991 (TEA 1991), Pub. L. No. 102-227, § 107(a)(1)(C),
105 Stat. 1686, 1687. The 1993 Tax Act makes the low-income housing credit
permanent, effective retroactively to June 30, 1992-the date the tax credit pro-
vision expired. OBRA 1993 § 13142(a), 107 Stat. at 438.
54. I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(D) (CCH 1993) (allowing unused housing credit for
given year to be carried over to succeeding year).
55. I.R.S. Notice 92-5, 1992-6 I.R.B. 11 (reporting recent estimate of resi-
dent population of 50 states by Bureau of the Census as 252 million people).
The total resident population is multiplied by $1.25. I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(C)(i)
(CCH 1993). The total credit authority for 1992 was $476.8 million. This
equalled the new 1992 authority plus any carryovers of unused authority from
prior years plus any returned credits plus national pool credit authority. NA-
TIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, 1992 SNAPSHOT SURVEY (1993)
[hereinafter 1992 SNAPSHOT].
56. I.R.C. §§ 38(c), 55(c)(2) (CCH 1993). For a discussion of provisions
enacted to ensure that the wealthy pay an equitable share of taxes, see infra
notes 168-95 and accompanying text.
57. I.R.C. § 469(i) (CCH 1993). For a discussion of the $25,000 allowance,
see infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the 1993 Tax
Act changes to the passive activity rules with respect to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1993, see infra note 186.
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low-income housing credit claimed. 58
The low-income housing credit had expired on June 30,
1992. 59 However, in the 1993 Tax Act, Congress permanently
extended the low-income housing credit retroactively effective to
June 30, 1992.60
C. History of the Low-Income Housing Credit
The low-income housing credit was enacted as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986.61 It replaced tax incentives such as spe-
cial accelerated depreciation, 62 five-year amortization of certain
rehabilitation expenditures 63 and special deductions for interest
and taxes paid during the construction period. 64 Congress be-
lieved that these existing tax expenditures for low-income rental
housing had not been effective in providing affordable housing
for low-income individuals. These provisions were not suffi-
ciently targeted, did not limit the rent that could be charged to
tenants and were not directly linked to the number of units serv-
ing low-income persons. 65
The initial response to the credit program was not strong;
approximately twenty percent of the authorized credits were allo-
cated in 1987, the first year of the program. 66 In response to crit-
58. I.R.C. § 42(d)(4)(C) (CCH 1993). For a discussion of the recom-
mended treatment for the low-income housing tax credit, see infra notes 238-39
and accompanying text.
59. I.R.C. § 42(o) (CCH 1992), repealedby OBRA 1993 § 13142(a), 107 Stat.
at 438.
60. OBRA 1993 § 13142(a), 107 Stat. at 438.
61. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085,
2189-2208.
62. I.R.C. § 168(b)(4) (CCH 1985), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986
§ 201, 100 Stat. at 2121-37. Section 168(b)(4), prior to being amended, allowed
accelerated depreciation at 200% declining balance over 15 years. Id. Cur-
rently, however, the statute requires that all residential real property be depreci-
ated over 27.5 years. I.R.C. § 168(c)(1) (CCH 1993).
63. I.R.C. § 167(k)(1), repealedby OBRA 1990 § 11812(a)(1)-(2), 104 Stat. at
1388-534.
64. I.R.C. § 189(d)(1), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 803(b)(1), 100
Stat. at 2355. The Internal Revenue Code currently requires that interest and
taxes incurred with respect to real property and attributable to the construction
period be capitalized. I.R.C. § 263A(f) (CCH 1993); BLUEBOOK, supra note 45, at
511 n.63.
65. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 25, at 758.
66. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES & FORD FOUNDATION,
LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT IN THE 1990's 7 (1989); see also NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, Low-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PRO-
DUCTION, CALENDAR YEAR 1987 (1993) (presenting schedule of total credit au-
thority and credits allocated for all 50 states and indicating that 20% of total
credit authority was allocated for 1987).
19931 883
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icisms of the credit, Senators George Mitchell and John C.
Danforth formed a task force in May, 1988, to 1) review the
achievements of the credit program, 2) define the appropriate
role of the credit in the overall housing policy framework and 3)
propose improvements needed to create an optimum program.
The task force comprised representatives of academia, the hous-
ing development community, tenants, nonprofit organizations,
real estate syndicators and state housing credit agencies. 67 The
Mitchell-Danforth Task Force undertook a detailed assessment of
the program, meeting on six occasions to hear testimony from a
total of fourteen witnesses. 68
The Report of the Mitchell-Danforth Task Force on the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit, released in January 1989, became
the basis for two pieces of legislation introduced by Senators
Danforth and Mitchell, the Community Revitalization Tax Act of
1989 (S. 342)69 and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Act of
1989 (S. 980).70 Many of the recommended changes in these bills
were adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
(OBRA 1989) 7 1 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990 (OBRA 1990).72 In order to demonstrate the problems of
adhering too strictly to tax policy principles when implementing
social policy through the tax code, this Article outlines the various
housing policy objectives in these bills and the tax policy consid-
erations that postponed, jeopardized or thwarted their successful
implementation.
II. HOUSING POLICIES IN CONFLICT WITH TAX POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
A. Transferring Ownership to Housing Nonprofits
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Act of 198973 included
67. REPORT OF THE MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE ON THE LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT 1 (1989) [hereinafter MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE
REPORT].
68. See id. at 19, app. I (noting six specific dates on which Task Force met
and panelists that appeared before Task Force on each day).
69. S. 342, supra note 18.
70. S. 980, supra note 15.
71. OBRA 1989 § 7108, 103 Stat. at 2306-22. In addition to restructuring
the low-income housing tax credit, OBRA 1989 extended the credit through
1990 although only on a nine months equivalent basis ($0.9375 instead of $1.25
per resident). Id.
72. OBRA 1990 § 11407, 104 Stat. at 1388-475. OBRA 1990 also restored
the credit to $1.25 per resident and extended it through 1991. Id.
73. S. 980, supra note 15.
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many of the Mitchell-Danforth Task Force recommendations re-
lated to the restructuring of the low-income housing credit.74 For
example, the Task Force recommended that nonprofit organiza-
tions and tenant cooperatives should be allowed to negotiate be-
low-market purchase options with investors during a project's
initial development without disqualifying the investors from
claiming the credit while they own the property. 75 The Mitchell-
Danforth Task Force had recommended this change as a means of
extending the low-income use of the property well beyond the
fifteen-year compliance period.76 There was great concern that as
private owners became legally able, they would convert their low-
income properties to more profitable uses. 77 Consequently, the
Task Force encouraged increased participation by nonprofit
groups in the ownership and management of the low-income
housing credit properties. 78 Because use of the refundability
mechanism was not considered politically feasible, below-market
purchase options were the second best alternative for increasing
nonprofit ownership of these properties. 79
74. Id.
75. MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 67, at 19. The
task force made other recommendations that were designed to ensure: (1) that
states fully use their allocations; (2) that tax-exempt bonds and other federal,
state and local subsidies are used efficiently; (3) that the low-income housing
credit is responsive to the development process, whether sponsored by for-
profit or not-for-profit developers; (4) that the housing credit program is viable
in center city, urban and rural markets; and (5) that the housing tax credits are
compatible with other housing subsidy programs. Id.
76. See id. at 3-4 (offering several recommendations designed to extend
"duration of low-income use"). On March 2 and 3, 1988, several representa-
tives of nonprofits testified as to the desirability of below-market purchase op-
tions as a means to ensuring that the property would be permanently devoted to
nonprofit low-income housing. See Low-Income Housing Tax Credits and the Role of
Tax Policy in Preserving the Stock of Low-Income Housing: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 182, 275-76 [hereinafter 1988 Hearings] (testimony of Andrew Ditton, Vice-
President of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, and statement of Barry
Zigas, President of the National Low Income Housing Coalition). Mr. Ditton
and Mr. Zigas asserted that an absolute preference should be adopted for hous-
ing transfers from for-profit to not-for-profit organizations. Id.
77. 1988 Hearings, supra note 76, at 182. The representatives for the non-
profit organizations predicted serious low-income housing shortages if non-
profit organizations could not take advantage of the tax credit other than by
entering into syndications with for-profit groups. Id. As housing markets be-
come increasingly tight, for-profit groups are likely to convert the low-income
housing projects after the 15-year period into market rate housing units. Id.
78. MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 67, at 19.
79. Refundability provides that a taxpayer with no tax liability is entitled to
a check from the Treasury for any tax benefits. For a discussion of refundability
and other options, see infra notes 125, 139-44 and accompanying text.
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With the enactment of the low-income housing credit in
1986, Congress clearly intended for nonprofit organizations to
continue playing a major role in providing low-income housing.
Congress demonstrated this intent in the initial legislation by cre-
ating a special set-aside for qualified nonprofit organizations.80
Ten percent of each state's credit authority is set aside for the
exclusive use of qualified nonprofit organizations, an amount cur-
rently equal to $0.125 per resident of the state.8' Although the
state may not reduce the amount of the set-aside, it may allocate
additional amounts of the remaining credit authority to qualified
nonprofit organizations.
Despite this clear preference toward nonprofit involvement
in the credit program, the low-income housing credit is not re-
fundable. Taxpayers receive the benefit of the credit only to the
extent that they have tax liabilities to offset the credit. Because
nonprofit organizations are tax-exempt entities, it is necessary for
them to form partnerships with taxpaying investors to take advan-
tage of the provision.8 2 Typically, a nonprofit will function as a
one percent general partner in a low-income housing credit trans-
action 83 and the limited partners who invest will receive ninety-
nine percent of the tax benefits.84 In some cases, a nonprofit
group will be a co-general partner with a for-profit developer.
These arrangements, however, do not give the nonprofit organi-
zation control over the low-income housing project. After the
low-income use restriction expires, the limited partners may le-
80. I.R.C. § 42(h)(5)(C) (CCH 1993). The organization must be a
§ 501(c)(3) or § 501(c)(4) organization that has as one of its exempt purposes,
the fostering of low-income housing. Id. The organization also must materially
participate in the development and continuing operation of the qualifying pro-
ject. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6) (CCH 1993); see also BLUEBOOK, supra note 45, at 167-68
(expressing intent to foster development of low-income housing by providing
for set-aside allocations of credit authority to qualified nonprofit organizations).
81. I.R.C. § 42(h)(5)(A) (CCH 1993); see also I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(C)(i) (setting
housing credit ceiling for calendar year equal to $1.25 multiplied by the state
population).
82. 1988 Hearings, supra note 76, at 409 (statement of John V. Helmick on
behalf of Yale Law School's Workshop on Shelter for Homeless and H.O.M.E.,
Inc.). The Yale Shelter Project complained that too much of the credit was
spent on the transaction costs of the lawyers, accountants and middlemen neces-
sary to set up the complex structures needed for using the credit. Id.
83. Id. (discussing methods commonly used by nonprofit organizations to
transfer tax benefits derived from housing credits to for-profit investors).
84. A nonprofit organization that is a general partner must receive alloca-
tions of the income, gain, loss, deduction and credit proportionate to its interest
in the partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(ii) (as amended in 1991). Ex-
cept in unusual circumstances, this one percent allocation of the credit to the
nonprofit partner is wasted.
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gaily require the project to be sold or converted to market use. 5
Thus, the nonprofit organized to develop and operate the low-
income housing is not legally entitled to control the long-term
use of the tax credit property.
One goal of housing policy is to ensure that housing pro-
duced using government subsidies remains in low-income use for
the longest period possible.86 Nonprofit organizations involved
in the provision of low-income housing share this goal and would
provide longer-term low-income occupancy than would for-profit
investors. 87 With respect to a project allocated the tax credit after
1989, nonprofits may be able to purchase the low-income housing
units at the end of fifteen years for a statutorily defined formula
price in exchange for continued low-income occupancy. 88 This
formula, however, may translate into a purchase price that could
easily equal seventy percent of the original development cost 89
plus the amount of outstanding debt and any subsequent capital
improvements. 90 This price will be too high for the majority of
nonprofit organizations unless additional government monies are
made available.
Alternatively, many corporate investors in low-income hous-
ing would be willing to grant a nonprofit organization a below-
market purchase option on the property. These for-profit corpo-
rations often have no interest or desire to continue ownership of
low-income housing beyond the fifteen-year compliance period.
They invest in low-income housing in order to respond to their
85. See 1988 Hearings, supra note 76, at 182 (observing that investment part-
nerships are legally free to convert property to high-income use at end of use
restrictions). For projects that were allocated credits in 1987, 1988 and 1989, all
use restrictions end after 15 years. For projects receiving credit allocations after
1989, the owners will be able to dispose of the project after 15 years only under
certain conditions. For a description of these conditions, see supra notes 38-42
and accompanying text.
86. MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 67, at 9.
87. Id. at 19; see also 1988 Hearings, supra note 76, at 176-84 (statement of
Andrew Ditton, Vice-President of Local Initiatives Support Corporation,
describing nonprofit organizations as driving force behind low-income housing
effort and as not susceptible to pressures of abandoning low-income housing
projects after initial 15 year period).
88. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(F) (CCH 1993). The formula price is generally equal
to the outstanding balance on secured indebtedness, plus the investors' equity
contributions, as increased annually by the CPI, not to exceed five percent per
year. For further discussion of the formula price, see supra note 41 and accom-
panying text.
89. Assuming an investor's initial equity was 35% of the original develop-
ment costs and annual CPI increases of 5% for 15 years, the investor's selling
price could total as much as 70% of the original development costs.
90. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(F) (CCH 1993).
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community's housing crisis while receiving unique economic, so-
cial and corporate image benefits. 9 ' The benefit of possible ap-
preciation of the low-income housing units (residual value after
the fifteen years) is not an important consideration for many cor-
porate investors. 92 Most corporations (excluding personal ser-
vice or subchapter S corporations) 93 receive a greater return than
individual investors on a given low-income housing investment.
Because they are not subject to the passive activity rules, these
corporations can take advantage of depreciation deductions as
well as the tax credit. 94 Thus, because corporations already re-
ceive an adequate return, they are willing to forego future appre-
ciation to advance other social goals. 95 Unfortunately, current
law limits the ability of nonprofit organizations, at the outset of
the development process, to structure agreements with corporate
owners that would allow the property to be inexpensively trans-
ferred to nonprofit ownership at the end of the fifteen years
through the use of a below-market purchase option.96
91. Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Reve-
nue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 161
(1989) [hereinafter 1989 Hearings] (statement of F. Barton Harvey, III, Deputy
Chairman of Enterprise Foundation).
92. Id. For example, the Enterprise Foundation, a nonprofit charitable or-
ganization, has been able to successfully market tax credit investments to certain
socially-minded corporations for an after-tax internal rate of return of 15% dur-
ing the projected 15-year holding period (disregarding cash flow or capital ap-
preciation and achieving this return solely from the tax credits and tax benefits).
1988 Hearings, supra note 76, at 170-71 (statement of F. Barton Harvey, III, Dep-
uty Chairman of Enterprise Foundation).
93. I.R.C. § 469(a) (CCH 1993). Individuals and personal service corpora-
tions are subject to the disallowance rules for passive activity credits and losses.
Id. This means that personal service corporations and the individual sharehold-
ers of subchapter S corporations may only offset the low-income housing credit
against the regular tax liability of the taxpayer allocable to all passive activities as
defined in § 469(c). Thus, unlike a regular C corporation, neither the individual
shareholders of a subchapter S corporation nor a personal service corporation
are able under most circumstances to receive the full benefit of the low-income
housing credit or losses from these projects. Id. For a discussion of the 1993
Tax Act changes to the passive activity rules, see infra note 186.
94. I.R.C. § 469(a) (CCH 1993). Closely held corporations can offset busi-
ness income, but not portfolio income, with tax credits and passive losses.
I.R.C. § 469(e)(2).
95. 1989 Hearings, supra note 91, at 145-46 (statement of Paul S. Grogan,
President of Local Initiatives Support Corp.)
96. MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 67, at 19. But see
infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text for an explanation of the right of first
refusal provision.
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1. Tax Benefits Available Only to the True Owner
Tax law limits the availability of tax benefits-such as deduc-
tions and credits-to the true owner. Legal doctrines concerning
ownership of property for tax purposes have evolved over the
years through a series of court decisions holding that a true
owner must possess sufficient ownership attributes.97 Revenue
rulings and procedures issued by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) also provide guidance in this area. The determination of
tax ownership signifies who is entitled to the low-income housing
credit and depreciation deductions with respect to the property. 98
The law regarding the ownership of real estate for tax pur-
poses is in a state of confusion. 99 Essentially, the economic sub-
stance of a transaction, not its form, determines who is an owner
for tax purposes.100 Yet the leading United States Supreme
Court decision, Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,' 0° stands for the
proposition that a sale-leaseback will be respected regardless of
tax motivation if the transaction has a bona fide business purpose
and the lessor retains sufficient benefits and burdens of owner-
ship. 10 2 Unfortunately, Lyon did not specify the determinative
97. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Requirement of Economic Profit in Tax Motivated
Transactions, 59 TAXES 985, 988 (1981). One test that has been used to deter-
mine whether ownership attributes are sufficient is "whether the buyer-lessor
would acquire an equity that it could not prudently abandon." Id.
98. Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87 (providing comprehensive list of tax
consequences associated with property ownership and demonstrating when
lessee will be treated as true owner in sale-leaseback situation).
99. SeeJoshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 365, 436 (1988). According to Professor Rosenberg:
The problem is that the cases are generally concerned with determining
which of two (or more) parties is the 'owner' of a specific depreciable
asset. But to the extent that the concept of ownership has any real
meaning (outside of tax law), it relates not to an asset as a whole, but to
certain rights to act with respect to that asset.
Id. In addition to this conceptual problem, there are difficulties with the tangi-
ble definition of ownership, evidenced by the suggestion that some consider it a
"realistic hope of profit" while others view it as "a realistic possibility of loss."
Id.
100. See generally Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87, 88 (stating that eco-
nomic substance of transaction determines true ownership for tax purposes).
101. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
102. Id. at 583-84. For a criticism of this decision, see Bernard Wolfman,
The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure ofJudicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
1075, 1094 (1981). In evaluating the Court's opinion, Professor Wolfman states
that "the poor substantive result in Frank Lyon presents a strong argument for
hesitance on the part of the Court to grant certiorari in a civil tax case unless it is
certain that a square conflict divides the circuits." Id. Professor Wolfman is crit-
ical of the Court's reasoning, government counsel and the operation of the
whole adversary process in this case. Id. at 1076-77. He takes particular issue
1993]
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content of the ownership attributes 10 3 and at least six different
tests for the determination of tax ownership exist in lower court
decisions. 0 4 Two of the most frequently cited tests are: 1)
whether sufficient benefits and burdens of ownership have passed
from the seller to the purchaser (the "benefits and burdens"
test); 10 5 and 2) whether the purchaser has acquired sufficient
characteristics of tax ownership (the "various-factors" test).' 0 6
The "benefits and burdens" test typically involves considera-
tion of several factors such as: the right to appreciation in the
value of the property; the right to use the property; the right to
the profits generated by use of the property; liability for real es-
tate taxes; and the risk of loss.' 0 7 Although courts often implicitly
weigh these factors, most cases take an aggregate approach to an-
alyzing the benefits and burdens of ownership.' 0 8 In contrast,
courts using the "various-factors" test discuss factors such as pas-
sage of title, the parties' treatment of the transaction, equity in
with many of the 26 enumerated factors that the Court emphasized in reaching
its conclusion. Id. at 1086-88.
103. For a discussion of the Frank Lyon Co. case and the attributes of true
ownership, see Warren, supra note 97.
104. Richard E. Marsh, Jr., Tax Ownership of Real Estate, 39 TAX LAW. 563,
566-67 (1986). Mr. Marsh argues that the six tests, with the possible exception
of the benefits and burdens test, misstate current law. Id. The six tests in re-
verse order of their frequency of application are:
(1) whether, under state law, title or 'equitable title' has passed to the
purchaser (the 'title' test); (2) whether the parties intended the transac-
tion to be treated as a sale (the 'intent' test); (3) particularly as to sellers
on an accrual method of accounting, whether the transaction uncondi-
tionally obligates the purchasers to pay the purchase price (the 'accrual'
test); (4) whether sufficient benefits and burdens of ownership have
passed from the seller to the purchaser (the 'B & B's' test); (5) whether,
under an ever growing laundry list of 'relevant factors,' the purchaser
has acquired sufficient characteristics of tax ownership (the 'various-
factors' test); and (6) whether either title or the benefits and burdens of
ownership has passed ( .. .the 'Dettmers' test).
Id. at 566; see also Dettmers v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1970), af'g
sub nom. Johnson v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 290 (1968) (establishing "Dettmers"
test); Wiseman v. Scruggs, 281 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1960) (recognizing "accrual"
test); Peavy v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 934 (D. Kan. 1963) (recognizing "ti-
tle" test); Field v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 961 (1971) (recognizing "in-
tent" test).
105. See Boykin v. Commissioner, 344 F. 2d 889, 894 (1965) (citing Merrill
v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 66 (1963), afd, 336 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1964)); see also
Marsh, supra note 104, at 567-68.
106. See Commissioner v. Segall, 114 F.2d 706, 709-10 (6th Cir. 1940), rev'g
38 B.T.A. 43 (1938), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 562 (1941) (emphasizing factors such
as passage of title, transfer of possession, purchaser's unconditional duty to pay
and intention of parties).
107. Marsh, supra note 104, at 575-76.
108. Id.
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the property, the existence of a binding legal obligation, the right
of possession, liability for property taxes and the right to appreci-
ation and operating profits.10 9 Under the "various-factors" test, a
tax owner of property is the one with a preponderance of these
incidents of ownership."10 In any event, an analysis of the more
recent cases indicates that most courts appear to be applying the
"benefits and burdens" test to determine tax ownership.' I I
In the leasing area, where the IRS sometimes attempts to
treat the lease of property as a sale, the IRS undertakes a case-by-
case analysis based on the specific facts and circumstances of each
case. In Revenue Ruling 55-540,112 the IRS listed the criteria that
distinguish a sale from a true lease of property." 13 A lease may be
recast as a sale if any one of the criteria is present. The focus of
the cited criteria is generally on those transactions in which the
lessee pays rent in excess of fair rental value in exchange for a
bargain purchase option.' 14 The IRS has promulgated guidelines
in Revenue Procedure 75-21' l 5 for the issuance of an advance
109. Grodt and McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237-
38 (1981) (discussing factors commonly considered under "various factors"
test).
110. Marsh, supra note 104, at 576.
111. Id. at 582-83. For a recent case focusing on the benefits and burdens
test, see Major Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 373 (1981),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 749 F.2d 1483 (11 th Cir. 1985).
112. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39.
113. Id. The criteria that distinguish a sale from a true lease of property
are:
(a) Portions of the periodic payments are made specifically applicable
to an equity [interest] to be acquired by the lessee.
(b) The lessee will acquire title upon the payment of a stated amount of
'rentals' which under the contract he is required to make.
(c) The total amount which the lessee is required to pay for a relatively
short period of use constitutes an inordinately large proportion of the
total sum required to be paid to secure the transfer of the title.
(d) The agreed 'rental' payments materially exceed the current fair
rental value. This may be indicative that the payments include an ele-
ment other than compensation for the use of property.
(e) The property may be acquired under a purchase option at a price
which is nominal in relation to the value of the property at the time
when the option may be exercised, as determined at the time of enter-
ing into the original agreement, or which is a relatively small amount
when compared with the total payments which are required to be made.
(f) Some portion of the periodic payments is specifically designated as
interest or is otherwise readily recognizable as the equivalent of
interest.
Id. at 41-42 (citations omitted).
114. Marsh, supra note 104, at 591.
115. Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715, modifiedby Rev. Proc. 79-48, 1979-2
C.B. 529, modified by Rev. Proc. 81-71, 1981-1 C.B. 731.
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ruling on whether certain equipment leasing transactions will be
respected for federal income tax purposes." 6 Although the
guidelines do not apply to real property leases, they are still gen-
erally considered when structuring lease transactions. The guide-
lines include such criteria as: 1) the lessor must retain sufficient
benefits and burdens of ownership; 2) there must be a reasonable
expectation of deriving a profit independent of tax benefits; and
3) the lessee may not have a below-market purchase option." 17
The IRS will respect a lease only if the lessor retains a significant
residual in the property and obtains some net cash flow from the
transaction.
The right to appreciation has been an important incident of
ownership for the purposes of determining the tax owner of
property under both the case law and the administrative guidance
provided by the IRS." l8 The prohibition against the lessee ob-
taining a below-market purchase option demonstrates the IRS's
position that such an option sufficiently curtails the right to ap-
preciation so as to justify treating the transaction as a sale. Thus,
in the IRS's view, ownership of the property has shifted to the
lessee and tax law principles require that the tax benefits afforded
116. Id. The criteria of Revenue Procedure 75-21 are as follows:
(1) the lessor must have made a minimum unconditional at-risk in-
vestment in the property equal to 20% of the cost of the leased prop-
erty at the beginning of and during the entire lease term;
(2) the lessor must demonstrate that the fair market value at the
end of the lease will be equal to at least 20% of the original cost of the
property and the remaining useful life will be the longer of one year or
20% of the originally estimated useful life of the property;
(3) the lessee, any shareholder of the lessee, and any party related
to the lessee cannot furnish or lend any part of the funds to purchase
the leased property or guarantee any indebtedness of the lessor with
respect to such property;
(4) the lessor must represent that the lease will produce a profit
and have a cash flow in addition to the value of any tax benefits, such as
the depreciation allowance;
(5) no member of the lessee group may have a contractual right to
purchase the property from the lessor at a price below the fair market
value at the time of exercising the right; and
(6) the lessor may have neither a contractual right to cause the
lessee to purchase the property when the property is first placed in ser-
vice nor any present intention to acquire such a contractual right. The
effect of any such right acquired at a subsequent time will be deter-
mined at that time, based on all the facts and circumstances.
Id.
117. See id. (discussing criteria considered necessary for transaction to be
treated as valid lease).
118. See Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377, 1436 (1980) (stating that
taxpayer's right to appreciation in value of property is very important in deter-
mining tax ownership).
[Vol. 38: p. 871892
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by deductions and credits follow tax ownership.' 19 Similarly,
there was congressional concern that the grant of a below-market
option (as proposed by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Act
of 1989) was a substantial enough relinquishment of one of the
benefits of ownership such that true ownership was at issue.
Therefore, Congress was unwilling to enact the Mitchell-Danforth
Task Force's recommendation that would permit the grant of a
below-market option to nonprofit organizations during a credit
project's initial development.
2. Tax Benefits Independent of Tax Ownership
Even if one concedes that the grant of a below-market
purchase option is enough to jeopardize tax ownership, statutory
precedents exist for providing tax benefits independent of tax
ownership. For example, prior to 1986, a taxpayer was eligible
for accelerated write-offs of up to $40,000 of rehabilitation ex-
penditures, if the taxpayer participated in a program that pro-
vided for the below-market sale of low-income housing units to
tenants. 1 2 0
Another example was a provision in the 1981 Economic Re-
covery Tax Act' 2 ' known as "safe harbor leasing."' 2 2 Under the
safe harbor leasing provision-assuming certain requirements
were met-a leveraged equipment lease was recognized for tax
purposes even if the lessor had no prospect of a pre-tax profit and
retained no residual. 23 In other words, the leveraged lease was
119. See Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 42. This Revenue Ruling holds that
the transaction will be treated as a sale if, "the property may be acquired under a
purchase option which is nominal in relation to the value of the property ... or
which is a relatively small amount when compared with the total payments which
are required to be made." Id.; see also Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 716 ("No
member of the Lessee Group may have a contractual right to purchase the prop-
erty from the lessor at a price less than its fair market value at the time the right
is exercised.").
120. I.R.C. § 167(k)(2)(B), repealed by OBRA 1990 § 11812(a)(1)-(2), 104
Stat. at 1388-534. Section 167(k)(2)(B) was applicable to expenditures for the
rehabilitation of low-income rental housing that were incurred prior to January
1, 1987, provided that the rehabilitation was conducted pursuant to a program
certified by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, his appointee, a
state or the United States. Id.
121. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201, 95 Stat. 172, 203-19 (former I.R.C.
§ 168(f)(8), repealed by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, §§ 208, 209, 96 Stat. 324, 432-47).
122. Id.
123. Id. The requirements under the "safe harbor leasing" provision were:
(1) that the lessor be a corporation, a partnership where all partners are corpo-
rations, or a grantor trust in which the grantor and all beneficiaries are corpora-
tions or partnerships consisting of corporations; (2) that the minimum
1993] 893
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respected for tax purposes even though the lessor lacked substan-
tial ownership attributes. 12 4 Safe harbor leasing was essentially a
compromise offered in lieu of actual refundability. 25 The goal
was to make the benefits of the accelerated cost recovery system
and the investment tax credit more widely available and to protect
companies holding unusable tax benefits from becoming targets
of takeover bids.' 26
Nonprofit organizations would prefer to receive the benefits
investment of the lessor was not less than 10% of the adjusted basis of the prop-
erty at the time the property first became the subject of the lease and at all times
during the lease; and (3) that the term of the lease was not greater than 90% of
the useful life of the property for purposes of § 167 or 150% of the present class
life of the property. Id.
124. See id. For a general discussion of tax ownership, see supra notes 97-
119 and accompanying text.
125. The mechanism of refundability provides that a taxpayer with no tax
liability is entitled to a check from the Treasury for any tax benefits.
Refundability was rejected with respect to the safe harbor leasing provision for
reasons summarized in the following passage. See Emil Sunley, Safe Harbor Leas-
ing, TAX FOUND. TAX. REV., Apr. 1982, at 17. According to Emil Sunley:
Refundability would tend to increase further the enormous power of
the tax-writing committees. Refundability also might further erode the
perception that the tax system is fair, since some companies will be pay-
ing what will be viewed as a negative income tax. Nonrefundability may
also help keep the investment credit from entities not subject to the
income tax, such as state and local governments, charities, and schools.
Finally, the business community may fear that if the investment credit is
made refundable, Congress will view it not as a reduction in tax, but as
a subsidy program for business, thereby endangering the basic credit
itself.
Id. at 19.
126. See id. at 17. Sunley notes that "without some form of transferability
or refundability of the tax benefits, profitable companies that cannot currently
use all their tax deductions and credits will become targets for tax-motivated
mergers or takeovers." Id.
Safe harbor leasing was repealed in 1982 for a variety of reasons. See STE-
PHEN B. COHEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 605-43
(1989). Corporations are not sympathetic beneficiaries of tax incentives. Safe
harbor leasing was characterized by the Washington Post on December 3, 1981
as "[t]he [g]reat [b]usiness [g]iveaway" and the "rent a deduction" provision by
former Internal Revenue Commissioner Sheldon S. Cohen. Id. at 618-19. Con-
versely, John Chapotan-Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy-
defended safe harbor leasing before the Senate Finance Committee on Decem-
ber 10, 1981, as a way to "make good investments equally profitable for compa-
nies in different tax situations." Id. at 619.
The safe harbor leasing technique was not considered effective from a cost-
benefit perspective. Id. at 623-25 (noting testimony of Professor Paul McDaniel
before Senate Budget Committee (November 24, 1981)). Moreover, there was
serious concern over the revenue loss from these leasing transactions. STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF
1982 53 (Comm. Print 1982).
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of the tax credit through the refundability mechanism. 27 Unfor-
tunately, refundability was not seriously considered when the low-
income housing credit was created. None of the incentives that
the low-income housing credit replaced, such as five-year amorti-
zation of rehabilitation expenditures, were refundable. Before
1978, refundable tax credits were considered revenue reductions
for budget purposes. However, under budget procedures
adopted in 1978,128 the refundable portion of any new refundable
tax credit is treated as an "outlay" and brought within the scope
of Appropriations Committee review. 12 9 Although the Appropri-
ations Committee cannot recommend any substantive changes in
the legislation, it can recommend an amendment to limit the total
amount of funding available for the legislation. °3 0 This limited
role is enough of a disincentive to using the refundability mecha-
nism because the tax-writing committees are disinclined to sur-
render their exclusive jurisdiction over a tax program.' 3 '
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Mitchell-Danforth
127. For a discussion of refundability, see supra note 125. For a discussion
of nonprofit organizations' preferences regarding the tax credit, see 1988 Hear-
ings, supra note 76, at 182, 278-79, 294, 410 (testimony of Andrew Ditton, Vice
President of the Local Initiatives Support Corp., statement of Barry Zigas, Presi-
dent of the National Low Income Housing Coalition, letter of Sheldon L. Bas-
kin, and statement of John V. Helmick on behalf of the Yale Law School's
Workshop on Shelter for the Homeless and H.O.M.E. Inc.). Mr. Ditton ob-
served that a refundable credit would allow nonprofits to avoid syndication as is
now necessary in order to utilize the credit. Id. at 182. Mr. Zigas agreed with
Mr. Ditton stating that, "[m]any nonprofit organizations are reluctant to take
advantage of the tax credit because they cannot use it without giving up owner-
ship of the property." Id. at 278. Mr. Helmick also preferred refundability for
nonprofits, but stated if that were not possible he would prefer allowing non-
profits to transfer low-income housing credits directly to individual investors be-
cause that would be more efficient than the current practice. Id. at 410. The
primary advantage of refundability for nonprofits is that "[i]t would offer the
possibility of financing housing which would start out and end up in the non-
profit or social housing sector, free of the expiring use concerns which are now
preoccupying us." Id. at 278.
128. STAFF OF THE SENATE FINANCE COMM., 102D CONG., IST SESS., DATA
AND MATERIALS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1992 FINANCE COMMITrEE REPORT UNDER
THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT 8 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter DATA AND
MATERIALS].
129. Id. "Outlays" are defined as the amount of dollars spent for a particu-
lar activity. FEDERAL BUDGET FISCAL 1993, supra note 10, at 200. The total re-
sults from both new budget authority provided this year and from unexpended
balances of budget authority provided in previous years. Id.
130. DATA AND MATERIALS, supra note 128. In addition, an annual appropri-
ation is required for any new refundable credit whereas prior to 1978, the au-
thority of the permanent appropriation for tax refunds had been used. Id.
131. Essentially, the tax expenditure system allows the tax committees to
function as both an authorizing or legislative committee as well as an appropria-
tions committee. These committees authorize the substantive program and ap-
25
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Task Force, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Act of 1989132
proposed the use of below-market purchase options to encourage
increased participation by nonprofit groups in the ownership of
low-income housing. 33 Unfortunately, Congress would not ac-
cept this modification because of the tax policy concern that use
of such options removed any reasonable expectation that inves-
tors would derive a profit independent of tax benefits. As a com-
promise, however, the legislative process that culminated in the
enactment of OBRA 1989 yielded a special rule that permits own-
ers to receive the credit and other tax benefits even though the
tenants hold a right of first refusal for the purchase of their units
(at the end of the fifteen-year compliance period) for a specified
minimum purchase price.' 3 4 The price is generally equal to the
outstanding indebtedness secured by the property plus all fed-
eral, state and local taxes attributable to the sale.' 3 5 The next
year, in OBRA 1990, this provision was expanded to permit other
organizations such as tenant cooperatives, resident management
corporations, qualified nonprofits 3 6 and governmental agencies
to incorporate a right of first refusal at this special formula price
into the deal at the outset.'3 7
The formula right of first refusal is a rather unusual legisla-
tive creation.' 38 Normally a right of first refusal is "a right to buy
before or ahead of [another]; thus, . . . [the contract gives] to the
prospective purchaser the right to buy upon specified terms, but,
propriate the necessary funds through a reduction in revenue receipts. SURREY,
supra note 1, at 145.
132. S. 980, supra note 15.
133. For a discussion of the proposed use of below-market purchase op-
tions to encourage nonprofits to participate in ownership of low-income hous-
ing, see MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 67, at 19.
134. I.R.C. § 42(i)(7)(A) (CCH 1993), enacted by OBRA 1989 § 710 8 (q), 103
Stat. at 2321 ("No federal income tax benefit shall fail to be allowable to the
taxpayer with respect to any qualified low income building merely by reason of a
right of [first] refusal held by the tenants ....").
135. I.R.C. § 42(i)(7)(B) (CCH 1993). Federal, state and local taxes attrib-
utable to the sale are known as the investors' exit taxes. The outstanding in-
debtedness excludes any indebtedness incurred within the five-year period
ending on the date of the sale to the tenants. See id.
136. I.R.C. § 42(h)(5)(C). For a discussion of "qualified nonprofits," see
supra notes 80-87, 96 and accompanying text.
137. I.R.C. § 42(i)(7)(A); see also OBRA 1990 § 11407(b)(1), 104 Stat. at
1388-474.
138. The legislative history is silent on the mechanics of the right of first
refusal and, as of yet, there is no administrative guidance. Nonetheless, one can
surmise that if a potential buyer makes an offer to an investor, then the holder of
the right of first refusal (tenant, nonprofit, etc.) has the right to offer the statuto-
rily defined formula price for the building.
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and this is the important point, only if the seller decides to
sell."' 39 Therefore, unlike an option, the right of first refusal
does not give the holder the power to compel an unwilling owner
to sell. The compromise was most likely structured in this man-
ner because the right of first refusal leaves more power in the
hands of the owner whereas a purchase option would have given
more discretion to the prospective buyer.' 40 Clearly, the statute
does not allow the holder of the right of first refusal much discre-
tion as to price because the minimum purchase price formula will
not necessarily yield a below-market value price. 14' Thus, non-
profit groups have neither received the ability to negotiate the
purchase price of their choice nor the power to compel an unwill-
ing owner to sell.' 42 The right of first refusal does not protect
against the fact that the transaction corporate investors might be
willing to negotiate during the initial development of the low-in-
come housing property is not necessarily the transaction they
would choose fifteen years in the future.
The concerns over tinkering with one of the benefits of own-
ership, the right to appreciation with respect to the low-income
housing credit properties, are misplaced. Arguably, given the na-
ture of investment in low-income housing, the structure of low-
income housing credit transactions almost never meets the case-
law requirement of a potential pre-tax economic return 43 or cri-
teria provided by the IRS in Revenue Procedure 75-21.144 For
139. J.A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation, Pre-emptive Rights To Realty As Violation Of
Rule Against Perpetuities Or Rule Concerning Restraints On Alienation, 40 A.L.R. 3D
920, 924 (1991). The right of first refusal is distinguishable from an option, in
that an option allows a holder to compel the sale of property. Id. The right of
first refusal is a right that is contingent or conditioned on the owner's willing-
ness to sell. Id.
140. Id.; see also R. David Wheat, Comment, Clarifying the Nature of Louisiana's
Right of First Refusal in the Transfer of Immovables, 47 LA. L. REV. 899 (1987) (con-
trasting option and right of first refusal).
141. I.R.C. § 42(i)(7) (CCH 1993) (providing minimum purchase price
formula).
142. The National Housing Law Project testified that the minimum
purchase price is likely to be prohibitive for many community groups. For ex-
ample, exit taxes for a single 38-unit project entering construction in New York
City in 1992 are estimated at $568,000. DANIEL D. PEARLMAN & ROBERTA L.
YOUMANS, STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING LAw PROJECT SUBMITTED TO
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 7 (March 23, 1993).
143. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (holding transaction in-
valid for tax purposes because only appreciable effect of transaction was to re-
duce Knetsch's tax liability). For a discussion of the economic profit
requirement, see also Warren, supra note 97, at 986-87.
144. For a discussion of Revenue Procedure 75-2 1, see supra notes 115-16
and accompanying text.
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example, while investors in rental real estate typically obtain a re-
turn on investment through a return of cash flow, appreciation at
the time of disposition and any tax benefits realized, the profit for
investors in low-income housing is almost solely derived from tax
benefits. The fact that tax benefits provide these investors with
the return that makes the transaction worthwhile was acknowl-
edged in 1986 when the low-income housing credit was cre-
ated.' 45 At that time, Senate Finance Committee Chairman
Packwood justified the low-income housing credit on the basis
that tax incentives, not economic cash flow or appreciation, were
the true motivation behind investments in low-income
housing. 146
In the instance of low-income housing, it indeed does
not appreciate in value and indeed the rents are fixed.
And if we are going to have low-income housing in this
Nation for the very poor or those close to very poor, we
might as well realize the marketplace itself cannot afford
to provide it.
Therefore, if we do not have some incentive,
whether it is a Government appropriation program or a
Government tax incentive, there will be no low-income
housing .... 147
The IRS itself has acknowledged that congressional intent
should be considered as one of the facts and circumstances in de-
termining whether a taxpayer entered into an activity with the ob-
jective of making a profit. In Revenue Ruling 79-300,148 the IRS
decided not to use the "not-for-profit" argument of section
183' 4 9 to deny the tax losses from the construction and operation
of an apartment project for low- and moderate-income housing
145. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 252, 100 Stat. at 2189-2208.
146. Interview with Benson F. Roberts, Local Initiatives Support Corpora-
tion, in Washington, D.C. (October 5, 1990).
147. 132 CONG. REC. S8,132-02 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sena-
tor Packwood).
148. Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B. 112. The IRS acknowledged that tax
policy concerns should not frustrate congressional intent in accomplishing hous-
ing policy objectives. Id.
149. I.R.C. § 183(a) (CCH 1993). This section provides that an individual
who engages in a nonprofit activity will not be allowed any deductions attributa-
ble to such activity other than (1) deductions allowed regardless of whether or
not such activity is engaged in for profit and (2) a deduction equal to the amount
of the deduction that would be allowable only if the activity was engaged in for
profit, but only to the extent that the gross income derived from such activity for
the taxable year exceeds the deductions allowable in (1). I.R.C. § 183(b)(l)-(2).
898 [Vol. 38: p. 871
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under section 236 of the National Housing Act.' 50 The legislative
history indicated that in limiting rental charges, Congress as-
sumed that the deductibility of tax losses would provide investors
with an adequate return from their investment in low- or moder-
ate-income housing.' 51 Consequently, application of section 183
to disallow losses in this situation would frustrate Congress' in-
tent in enacting the housing legislation. 152
Thus, any attempt to inject a pre-tax profit requirement into
the determination of the tax ownership of low-income housing
credit projects ignores the economic realities of this kind of in-
vestment. 153 The benefits normally inherent in owning real estate
are not present in low-income housing credit projects. Investors
in qualified low-income housing projects are forced to comply
with rent restrictions that circumscribe their right to collect fair
market rents. Thus, the rents collected will rarely exceed the sum
of the operating costs and mortgage payments, making it ex-
tremely unusual for investors to receive any positive cash flow.
Moreover, the rules for projects allocated tax credits after
1989 already limit the investors' right to appreciation. Investors
must first offer the housing to a buyer who will continue its low-
income use or allow the housing credit agency one year to find
such a buyer at a statutorily defined formula price. 154 The owners
are free to sell or convert the project only if the agency cannot
find a suitable buyer. Even then, however, the owners' actions are
heavily restricted in that they may not evict existing tenants with-
out cause for a period of three years. 155 Thus, investors are usu-
ally unable to receive the highest price for their property unless
they postpone disposition or conversion until after the thirty-year
150. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1715(z)(1), enactedby Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 901, 82 Stat. 476.
151. S. REP. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1968). Referring to inves-
tors in low-income housing, the Senate report stated that "assuming the mem-
ber of the partnership is in a relatively high income tax bracket, his share of the
depreciation losses, plus income from project operations would provide an after
tax return on his investment .... " Id.
152. Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B. 112.
153. Professor Warren argues that where Congress has enacted an incen-
tive for the very purpose of inducing changes in taxpayer behavior, requiring a
pre-tax profit would directly interfere with this congressional goal. Warren,
supra note 97, at 990.
154. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(I) (CCH 1993) (describing procedure if there is no
buyer willing to maintain low-income status of credit project).
155. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(E) (CCH 1993). For a more detailed discussion of
§ 42(h)(6), see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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extended use period. By law, their right to appreciation has been
limited.
Furthermore, at least with respect to offerings targeting cor-
porate investors, any residual value of the low-income units is ig-
nored for purposes of valuing the owners' return on the
investment except for the expectation that corporate investors
will not have a tax liability at the end of fifteen years.1 56 The as-
sumption of no residual is also made in the prospectuses of many
public offerings. Therefore, the right to appreciation should not
be given such significance for the purpose of determining who is
the real owner.' 57 It is also unclear who, if not the investor,
would be the real owner in this situation. Only the investor bears
the risk of loss on his investment if the low-income housing prop-
erty does not continue to meet the tenant income-and-rent re-
strictions over the fifteen-year compliance period. 58 Should a
nonprofit organization (usually a one percent general partner) or
a tenant be considered the owner of the low-income housing
property solely because of an option to purchase the property in
fifteen years at a below-market price? Unlike the lease/sale situa-
tion, neither the nonprofit organization nor the tenant is paying
excessive rents that should be recharacterized as installments on
the purchase price.' 59
Requiring the retention of a residual would make the low-
income housing credit a less efficient method of conferring tax
benefits, on low-income renters. Depending on market adjust-
ments, such a requirement could result in the investor reaping
more benefits should there be appreciation in the value of the
property. Tax expenditures to stimulate certain investments are
most efficient when investors receive no more than is necessary to
induce the investment. A below-market purchase option transfers
more of the benefits to low-income tenants and facilitates transfer
of ownership to those organizations dedicated to preserving the
affordable housing stock. Congress' unwillingness to provide ex-
156. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 91, at 162 (statement of F. Barton Har-
vey, III, Deputy Chairman, The Enterprise Foundation).
157. For a discussion of the right to appreciation as an incident of owner-
ship, see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
158. See I.R.C. § 42(g) (CCH 1993). If the low-income housing property
fails to comply with the applicable requirements during the fifteen-year compli-
ance period, the taxpayer will usually have to recapture the tax credit. I.R.C.
§ 42(j). For a discussion of the rules regarding the recapture of the tax credit,
see supra note 36.
159. For a discussion of the criteria that distinguish a sale from a true lease,
see Revenue Ruling 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39.
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plicitly for the ability to use a below-market purchase option has
jeopardized an important housing policy objective-the transfer
of low-income housing to owners who will continue to keep it
available to low-income tenants-for no apparent tax policy gain.
B. Encouraging Investment in Low-Income Housing
The housing policy goal of encouraging investment in low-
income housing has been jeopardized by the tax policy goal of
ensuring that the wealthy pay an equitable amount of taxes.
However, no conflict between these two goals actually exists if the
low-income housing credit is fully capitalized. Full capitalization
occurs when investors pay a sufficient premium for the after-tax
income such that the yield equals that of a comparable taxable
investment taking into consideration liquidity, risk and other fac-
tors. This phenomenon is known. as the payment of implicit
taxes.' 60 Absent adequate payment of implicit taxes, the conflict
between these two goals can be reconciled by treating the tax
credit properly for income measurement purposes. This Article
concludes that the proper tax treatment of the low-income hous-
ing credit is to reduce the basis of the low-income housing credit
property.' 6 '
The low-income housing credit is an explicit example of a tax
expenditure provision that is functionally equivalent to a direct
expenditure program. It is a housing program (administered by
the IRS and the appropriate state or local housing credit agency)
that seeks to increase the stock of affordable rental housing by
encouraging new construction or rehabilitation of housing for
low-income tenants. The low-income housing credit attempts to
provide a market rate of return to the investors who provide the
equity for a project. 62 In exchange, the owner must set aside a
minimum number. of units that have rent ceiling restrictions for
low-income tenants.' 63 The Join*t Committee on Taxation esti-
mated that this program would cost the government $700 million
160. For further discussion of implicit taxes and capitalization of the tax
credit, see infra notes 242-55 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion of the proper treatment of tax credits for income
measurement purposes, see infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion of the purpose and economic effect of the low-income
housing credit, see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
163. I.R.C. § 42(g)(1)-(2) (CCH 1993). For a more detailed discussion of
the rent restrictions placed on qualified low-income housing units, see supra
notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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in foregone tax revenues in 1992.164
The goal of the program is to stimulate the production or
rehabilitation of low-income housing so that low-income individ-
uals can have a decent and affordable place to live. 165 For 1989,
full utilization of the low-income housing credit would have pro-
duced approximately 127,350 units of low-income housing. 166 In
order for the tax credits to translate into quality low-income hous-
ing projects, the bidding for the tax credits must be competitive.
Moreover, to guarantee that the maximum number of projects are
realized, the credit must be in sufficient demand so as to fully util-
ize each state's allocation of credit authority. Thus, the low-in-
come housing credit must be designed to ensure a steady flow of
equity capital to compete for the available credits. Restrictions
that decrease the pool of investors merely diminish the amount of
equity raised per credit dollar. 167
1. Ensuring That the Wealthy Pay an Equitable Amount of Taxes
As originally enacted, the low-income housing credit was
subject to three separate limitations on how much tax credit any
individual investor could utilize. First, the passive activity rules
allowed the credit to offset taxes on up to $25,000 of nonpassive
income, but only if the investor's adjusted gross income was be-
164. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., ESTIMATE OF FED-
ERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1991-1995 12 (Comm. Print 1990).
165. Rental units qualify a building for the tax credit only if the tenants
have an income below a specific predetermined level. I.R.C. § 42(g)(l)(A)-(B)
(CCH 1993). For a more detailed discussion of rent and income restrictions, see
supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
166. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, LOW-INCOME HoUs-
ING TAX CREDIT PRODUCTION, CALENDAR YEAR 1989 (May 7, 1990). The 97.8%
actual allocation in 1989 was expected to produce 124,518 low-income units
once the projects were placed in service. If by the end of the year the taxpayer
has spent ten percent of the project's expected cost, the low-income housing
credit project may be placed in service up to two years after the end of the year
in which the project was allocated the tax credit. I.R.C. § 42(h)(1)(E) (CCH
1993).
167. See MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 67, at 4. As-
suming that enough investors in low-income housing credit properties are af-
fected by the passive activity, general business credit and alternative minimum
tax limitations as to reduce demand below the level of supply at the break-even
point (the price at which the return equals the after-tax return from similar but
taxable investments), syndicators can no longer sell all of their tax credits at the
break-even yield. They must therefore compete for the available investors by
offering increased yields. This establishes a new equilibrium price at which the
yield is higher for the investors but the quantity of dollars invested in low-in-
come housing is lower than it would be without these restrictions. See Daniel
Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1243 (1989)
(providing further discussion of this analysis).
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low a threshold that began at $200,000 and phased-out at
$250,000.168 Second, the general business credit provision estab-
lished a maximum amount of income tax liability that could be
reduced by general business tax credits in any year. 169 Third, the
alternative minimum tax rules did not allow the low-income hous-
ing credit as an offset against the alternative minimum tax.' 70
These provisions were intended to address the concern that
wealthy investors would avoid paying their fair share of taxes by
investing in low-income housing.
In 1969, the Treasury published a study indicating that in
1966, 154 very high-income individuals had paid no taxes due to
the extensive use of tax preferences. Congress believed that the
fact that a small minority of high-income individuals were permit-
ted to escape tax on a large proportion of their income had seri-
ously undermined taxpayer belief that all were paying their fair
share of the tax burden.' 7 ' These concerns over taxpayer morale
prompted the enactment of the first minimum tax in 1969.
A major feature of the Tax Reform Act of 1986172 was an
expanded alternative minimum tax for individuals.' 73 The goal,
as expressed in the Senate Finance Committee Report, was "to
ensure that no taxpayer with substantial economic income can
avoid significant tax liability by using exclusions, deductions, and
168. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(B) (CCH 1989), amendedby OBRA 1989 § 7109, 103
Stat. at 2322. Because of the investor income limitations, it was necessary to
find investors who were certain that they would not make over $200,000 anytime
in the next ten years. Benson F. Roberts, Local Initiatives Support Corporation,
called it "the tax credit for the downwardly mobile." Roger Lowenstein, Tax
Credit to Spur Low-Income Housing Goes Begging, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1988, § 1, at
32.
169. I.R.C. § 38(c) (CCH 1993). General business tax credits include such
credits as the investment credit, the targeted jobs credit and the low-income
housing credit. I.R.C. § 38(b).
170. I.R.C. § 55(c)(2). Regular corporations that invest in low-income
housing credit projects are only subject to the general business credit and alter-
native minimum tax provisions. For a discussion of limitations placed on indi-
viduals, personal service corporations and closely held corporations, see supra
notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
171. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969). According to the
Senate report, certain tax preferences that may have been justified at the time of
their creation were no longer desirable, or even necessary. Id. The problems
created by these provisions were evidenced by a 1966 study that showed 100 out
of 154 individuals paying no taxes had incomes in excess of $1 million. Id. The
report concluded that "[i]t is essential that tax reform be obtained not only as a
matter of justice but also as a matter of taxpayer morale .... For this reason
alone, the tax system should be improved." Id.
172. Tax Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. at 2085.
173. Id. § 701, 100 Stat. at 2321.
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credits."' 174 Once again, the concern was raised that the ability of
high-income individuals to pay little or no tax would undermine
respect for the entire tax system. 175 Thus, the individual alterna-
tive minimum tax was raised to twenty-one percent' 76 and its base
was expanded to include twelve additional tax preferences. 77
OBRA 1990 raised the individual alternative minimum tax rate to
twenty-four percent' 78 and effective retroactively to January 1,
1993, the 1993 Tax Act' 79 increased this rate to a two-tier rate
structure of twenty-six percent and twenty-eight percent. 180
Similar concerns led to the enactment of the passive activity
rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.181 The Senate Finance
Committee Report stated "that taxpayers are losing faith in the
federal income tax system." 8 2 The report cites another Treasury
studyI 3 showing that in 1983, out of 260,000 tax returns report-
ing "total positive income"' 8 4 in excess of $250,000, eleven per-
174. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 25, at 518. The objective of the minimum
tax was to prevent high-income individuals from avoiding significant tax liability.
Id. The Committee on Finance found, however, that the minimum tax under
current law did not adequately address the problem of tax avoidance. Id. at 519.
The Committee stated that, "[b]y leaving out many important tax preferences,
or defining preferences overly narrowly, the individual and corporate minimum
taxes permit some taxpayers with substantial economic incomes to report little
or no minimum taxable income and thus to avoid all tax liability." Id. The Com-
mittee on Finance recommended that certain items, currently not treated as
preferences, be added to the minimum tax base. Id.
175. Id. The Committee on Finance stated that "it is inherently unfair for
high-income individuals and highly profitable corporations to pay little or no tax
due to their ability to utilize various tax preferences." Id. at 519.
176. I.R.C. § 55, amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 701(a), 100 Stat. at
2320 (prior to amendment by OBRA 1990 § 11102(a), 104 Stat. at 406).
177. I.R.C. § 57 (CCH 1993).
178. I.R.C. § 55, amendedby OBRA 1990 § 11102(a), 104 Stat. at 406 (prior
to amendment by OBRA 1993 § 13203, 107 Stat. at 461-62).
179. OBRA 1993 § 13203(a), 107 Stat. at 461-62.
180. I.R.C. §§ 55(b)(1), (d)(1) (CCH 1993). For non-corporate taxpayers
whose alternative minimum taxable income exceeds the exemption amount by
$175,000 or less, the 26% rate applies. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i)(I). The 28% rate
applies to any excess alternative minimum taxable income. I.R.C.
§ 55(b)(l)(A)(i)(II).
181. I.R.C. § 469 (CCH 1986), enacted by Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 501,
100 Stat. at 2233 (current version at I.R.C. § 469 (CCH 1993)) (placing limita-
tions on deduction of losses and use of credits from passive activities).
182. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 25, at 713. According to the report, tax-
payer loss of confidence in the tax system is largely a product of the interaction
between: (1) the high marginal rates; and (2) the potential to offset income from
one source with tax shelter deductions and credits from another source. Id.
183. TREASURY DEP'T, TAXES PAID BY HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS AND THE
GROWTH OF PARTNERSHIPS, reprinted in IRS STATISTICS INCOME BULLETIN 55 (Fall
1985).
184. Id. The Treasury Department defined total positive income as the sum
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cent paid taxes equalling five percent or less of total positive
income. The Senate Finance Committee believed that tax shel-
ters, by passing through tax benefits that offset positive sources of
income, had enabled some taxpayers with appreciable economic
incomes to reduce their tax liabilities substantially.' 8 5 Thus, the
passive activity rules restrict the use of losses or credits from busi-
ness activities in which a taxpayer does not materially partici-
pate, 18 6 against other sources of income such as salary and
portfolio income. There is a special limited relief provision for
rental real estate, 8 7 and low-income housing credits are eligible
regardless of whether or not the individual actively participates in
the low-income rental real estate activity.' 8 In recognition of the
need for investors, taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of up to
$250,000 were allowed to offset tax on up to $25,000 of nonpas-
sive income with the low-income housing credit.' 8 9 OBRA 1989
subsequently removed this income limitation'9" in response to
the concern that it excluded "some individuals from the pool of
of wages and salary, interest, dividends and income from profitable businesses
and investments, as reported on tax returns. Id.
185. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX REFORM
PROPOSALS: TAX SHELTERS AND MINiMUM TAX (Comm. Print 1985). The concern
was that as the tax base erodes due to tax shelters, tax rates must be increased if
revenue levels are to be maintained. Id. at 16. This in turn increases the de-
mand for tax shelters, and directly results in increased tax burdens falling on
those who are unable to take advantage of tax shelters. Id.
186. I.R.C. § 469 (CCH 1993). Prior to 1994, rental activities were treated
as passive activities regardless of the level of the taxpayer's participation. I.R.C.
§ 469(c)(2) (CCH 1993). Effective for tax years beginning after 1993, however,
the 1993 Tax Act changes the passive activity loss rules with respect to the rental
real estate activities of individual owners who spend more than 50% of their
working time (a minimum of 750 hours) in real property trades or businesses.
I.R.C. § 469 (c)(7), enacted by OBRA 1993 § 13143, 107 Stat. at 440-41. An eligi-
ble taxpayer's losses and credits from the activities in which the taxpayer materi-
ally participates may be used to offset nonpassive income. Id. A closely held C
corporation will be eligible for this rule if more than 50% of the corporation's
gross receipts for the taxable year are derived from real property trades or busi-
nesses in which the corporation materially participates. I.R.C. § 469(c)(7)(D).
All losses and credits from 1993 and all prior years will continue to be treated as
under prior law. OBRA 1993 § 13143, 107 Stat. at 440-41.
187. I.R.C. § 469(i) (CCH 1993). An individual may offset up to $25,000 of
nonpassive income by utilizing losses and credits from rental real estate activi-
ties in which such individual actively participates. I.R.C. § 469(i)(1). The
$25,000 allowance is phased-out by 50% of the amount by which the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income for the year (determined without regard to passive activ-
ity losses, IRA contributions, or taxable social security benefits) exceeds
$100,000. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3).
188. I.R.C. § 469(i)(6)(B).
189. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(B) (CCH 1989), amended by OBRA 1989 § 7102, 103
Stat. at 2322.
190. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(C), enacted by OBRA 1989 § 7109, 103 Stat. at 2322
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likely investors in low-income housing property."'' 91
The Tax Reform Act of 1986192 also tightened the general
business credit limitations.193 Citing the ability to reduce tax lia-
bility to very low percentages, the Senate Finance Committee rec-
ommended limiting to seventy-five percent the amount of income
tax liability (in excess of $25,000) that may be offset by all general
business credits.' 94 Once again, the Senate Finance Committee's
justification for the change was concern over confidence in the
equity of the tax system. 195
2. Reconciling Low-Income Housing Investment with Vertical Equity
Concerns
The application of the passive activity, general business
credit and alternative minimum tax provisions essentially pre-
cluded a majority of the most likely individual investors from us-
ing the low-income housing credit as it was originally enacted. A
special exception permitted taxpayers with adjusted gross in-
comes under $200,000 to use up to the equivalent of a $25,000
deduction ($7,000 of the tax credit for taxpayers in the 28%
bracket) to offset nonpassive income. 196 Due to their income
levels, however, this exception was inapplicable to a majority of
the former investors in such real estate transactions. 19 7
(providing that phase-out of $25,000 allowance is not applicable to any portion
of passive activity credit that is attributable to low-income housing credit).
191. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1188 (1989) [hereinafter
H.R. REP. No. 247]. The House of Representatives report stated that "[tihe
committee believes that encouraging the provision of low-income housing is an
important goal of national housing policy. The Federal government can foster
this goal through . . . providing tax incentives to private investors to invest in
low-income housing projects ..... Id. For further discussion of how the passive
activity, general business credit and alternative minimum tax provisions essen-
tially precluded a majority of the most likely investors from using the low-in-
come housing credit as it was originally enacted, see infra notes 196-99 and
accompanying text'
192. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 221, 100 Stat. at 2173.
193. Id. (providing for reduction in tax liability that may be offset by gen-
eral business credits).
194. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 25, at 260. The low-income housing credit
is considered a general business credit. Id. Formerly, general business credits
could be used to reduce tax liability up to $25,000 plus 85% of tax liability in
excess of $25,000. Id.
195. Id.
196. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(B) (CCH 1989), amended by OBRA 1989 § 7109, 103
Stat. at 2322. This special provision related to any portion of the passive activity
credit attributable to the low-income housing or rehabilitation credit. For a dis-
cussion of the removal of this income limitation, see supra notes 189-91 and ac-
companying text.
197. See Janet Novack, Hitch 22, FORBES, Feb. 9, 1987, at 54. Novack stated
906 [Vol. 38: p. 871
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Furthermore, low-income housing projects had often been
structured as private placements under the Regulation D exemp-
tion from the public offering registration requirements of the Se-
curities Act of 1933.198 Regulation D requires that for offerings
in excess of $1,000,000, all but thirty-five investors must be "ac-
credited."' 99 Accredited investors are individuals with annual in-
comes exceeding $200,000 or net worths exceeding
$1,000,000.200 As most such accredited investors could not qual-
ify for the special credit exception from the passive activity rules,
private placements were predominantly replaced by registered
public offerings as the main investment alternative. This has led
to increased transaction costs primarily due to the significantly
higher syndication costs associated with public offerings. 20
The Community Revitalization Tax Act of 1989 2 2-as intro-
duced but not enacted-sought to increase the pool of investors
eligible to use the low-income housing credit and to expand the
number of practical financing mechanisms available to project
sponsors. 20 3 These goals were to be accomplished by modifying
that "Congress is giving tax breaks to draw capital into low-income housing, but
doesn't want people with capital to have tax breaks. [T]he credit is of little use
to the high-income individuals who would be suitable investors in these poten-
tially high risk deals." Id.
198. Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508
(1993); see also Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d., 77e. (1988) (exempting
certain transactions from requirement of filing registration statement).
199. Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii)
(1993). For the purposes of calculating the number of investors limited under
Regulation D, accredited investors are not included. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(e)(l)(iv). Moreover, an issuer under Regulation D must limit the
number of "purchasers" to 35. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii). Thus, all but 35
investors under Regulation D must be accredited investors, or excluded from
the calculation of "purchasers" for some other reason. Id. For a list of other
exclusions, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(l)(i)-(iii).
200. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505. To be an "accredited investor" based on annual
income, a natural person must have earned in excess of $200,000 in each of the
two most recent years, or have joint income with a spouse in excess of $300,000
in each of the two most recent years and reasonably expect to maintain this in-
come. Id. Status as an "accredited" investor allows a person to be excluded
from the calculation of the number of purchasers. Id. For other categories of
qualified investors, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (defining term "accredited
investor").
201. See ICF STUDY, supra note 32, at 9. This study, drawn from data
describing projects developed in 1987 and 1988, found that public syndications
raised only about 67 cents per tax credit dollar as compared to 87 cents for
private placements. Id.
202. S. 342, supra note 18.
203. 135 CONG. REC. S1095-96 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1989) (floor statement of
Senator Danforth). Senator Danforth hoped to restore vitality to the rehabilita-
tion and low-income housing credits "by shifting the credit use limitations for
9071993]
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the passive activity rules to limit their scope to include only
losses, not credits from low-income housing credit invest-
ments.20 4 Congress acknowledged the concern that some individ-
uals were being excluded from the pool of likely investors, by
removing the income limitation on the use of the special excep-
tion from the passive activity rules for the low-income housing
credit. 20 5 However, because OBRA 1989 did not remove the
credit completely from the passive activity rules, a taxpayer's in-
ability to use more than $7,000 of the credit annually limits the
amount a taxpayer will invest in low-income housing. 20 6 Thus,
private placements are still very difficult to negotiate because of
the number of investors required to raise the requisite amount for
the project.
Another significant problem with the low-income housing tax
credit is that any taxpayer subject to the alternative minimum tax
will be unable to fully utilize the credit because the credit cannot
be used against the alternative minimum tax. 20 7 The Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation estimated that 130,000 noncorporate taxpay-
ers would be subject to the alternative minimum tax in 1990.208
In 1991, with the increased alternative minimum tax rate of
twenty-four percent, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated
that 317,000 noncorporate taxpayers would be subject to the al-
ternative minimum tax. 20 9 With respect to corporate taxpayers,
the number of taxpayers affected by the alternative minimum tax
had grown from 17,000 in 1987 to 32,000 in 1990. Although al-
these programs from the passive loss rules into the general rules that limit use of
business credits." Id. at 1096. He proposed to do this as "an important first
step in our efforts to.ensure that the credits work and that low income housing is
available and cities in our Nation are decent, safe places to live." Id.
204. S. 342, supra note 18. To sell this departure from the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, the legislation tightened the general business credit limitation on indi-
viduals to the sum of the first $20,000 of a taxpayer's net tax liability plus 20%
of the liability exceeding $20,000. Id. In addition, the alternative minimum tax
system was left in place. Id.
205. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(B) (CCH 1989), repealed by OBRA 1989 § 7109, 103
Stat. at 2322; see H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 190, at 1188.
206. For 1991 and future years, it is possible to use $7,750 for those tax-
payers in the 31% bracket. For 1993 and future years, the $25,000 deduction
equivalent equals $9,000 ($25,000 x 36%) for those taxpayers in the 36%
bracket and $9,900 ($25,000 x 39.6%) for those in the 39.6% bracket.
207. For a discussion of the alternative minimum tax, see supra notes 173-
80 and accompanying text.
208. Letter from Joint Comm. on Taxation to Senator Danforth (Oct. 11,
1990) (on file with author).
209. Letter from Joint Comm. on Taxation to Senator Danforth (Oct. 23,
1990) (on file with author).
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ternative minimum tax taxpayers comprised less than one percent
of total corporate tax returns between 1987 and 1990, they did
represent approximately twenty to twenty-five percent of corpora-
tions with assets of $500,000.210 Such a reduction in the pool of
eligible investors increases the cost of raising equity capital. If
there is an insufficient number of potential investors relative to
the supply of low-income housing credit investments, the inves-
tors will pay less for the tax benefits. 211 Thus, the alternative
minimum tax rules, as well as the passive activity and general
business credit restrictions, blunt the effectiveness of this tax ex-
penditure. In fact, the alternative minimum tax system is incon-
sistent with the concept of tax expenditures.
a. Tax Expenditure Analysis
The tax expenditure concept recognizes that the tax system
contains two conceptually and functionally distinct components-
structural provisions necessary to implement the income tax and
tax expenditure provisions chosen to implement government
spending programs. 21 2 "The tax expenditure concept in essence
considers these special provisions as composed of two elements:
the imputed tax payment that would have been made in absence
of the special provision ... and the simultaneous expenditure of
that payment as a direct grant to the person benefitted by the spe-
cial provision." 2 13 Thus, under this concept, the low-income
housing credit works as follows: the taxpayer determines his tax
liability in the absence of the special incentive for investment in
qualified low-income housing projects and the government gives
the taxpayer a subsidy to compensate him for making the desired
investment. This subsidy payment is accomplished by allowing
210. GERALDINE GERARDI ET AL., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TEMPORAL
ASPECTS OF THE CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAx: RESULTS CORPORATE
PANEL DATA FOR 1987-1990 5. Note that the data used for 1990 is preliminary
data.
211. For a discussion of the consequence of the supply of credit properties
exceeding the demand for the low-income housing credit investments, see supra
note 167 and accompanying text.
212. SURREY, supra note 1, at 6. According to Surrey:
The federal income tax system consists really of two parts: one part
comprises the structural provisions necessary to implement the income
tax on individual and corporate net income; the second part comprises
a system of tax expenditures under which Governmental financial
assistance programs are carried out through special tax provisions
rather than through direct Government expenditures.
213. Id. at 6-7.
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the low-income housing credit to offset the taxpayer's regular tax
liability on a dollar-for-dollar basis.2 14
When a taxpayer is subject to the alternative minimum tax,
the government cannot make the subsidy payment until the tax-
payer is subject to the regular tax at some point in the future-if
ever. Given the uncertainty of the applicability of the alternative
minimum tax, many investors are leery of making an investment
in low-income housing. This wariness may become heightened if
the increases in the alternative minimum tax rates for
noncorporate taxpayers negatively affect taxpayers who have al-
ready invested in low-income housing. If these investors become
subject to the alternative minimum tax because of its broadened
applicability, the subsidy payments due them will be delayed
either in whole or in part. Thus, for the tax expenditure mecha-
nism to work, the low-income housing credit must be allowed to
offset the alternative minimum tax. Otherwise, recognition of the
possibility of a deferral in the ability to use the low-income hous-
ing credit will deter investment in low-income housing. 215 There-
fore, the alternative minimum tax rules frustrate the goal of
attracting investment in low-income housing for the purpose of
solving a perception problem-that wealthy investors are not pay-
ing their fair share of taxes. 216
214. See id. at 7.
215. The Senate Finance Committee recognized the possibility that a defer-
ral in the ability to use the credit would deter investment in low-income housing
and, thus, during OBRA 1990 conference negotiations attempted to insure that
past investors would receive the benefits they were promised. Unfortunately,
however, the House Ways and Means Committee was unwilling to tinker with
the alternative minimum tax, and, as a result, a compromise was reached that did
not directly deal with the problem.
Section 11407(c) of OBRA 1990 permits individual taxpayers, who held an
interest in low-income housing on October 26, 1990, to increase the credit
claimed in 1990 by up to 50% of the otherwise allowable credit. See OBRA 1990
§ 11407(c), 104 Stat. at 1388-1476. However, because the passive activity rule
special exception was not increased, taxpayers already deducting the maximum
credit (generally $7,000) will receive no benefit from this special provision. See
id. Thus, a taxpayer who loses some of the benefits of the low-income housing
credit in the future due to the application of the alternative minimum tax is not
necessarily able to take advantage of this 1990 election to accelerate the credit.
See id.
In all fairness, one must recognize that the Joint Committee on Taxation (as
advisors to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee) was given only one hour to devise a solution to this problem. Tele-
phone Interview with Thomas Barthold, Joint Committee on Taxation staff
member (March 12, 1993). At approximately 2:00 a.m., they were given the as-
signment to draft a solution by 3:00 a.m. Id.
216. See Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality and Strategy: The New Alternative
Minimum Tax, 66 TAXES 91, 97-102 (1988). According to Professor Shaviro, "re-
910 [Vol. 38: p. 871
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Most direct expenditures are given on a pre-tax basis and
must be included in the gross income of their beneficiaries. For
example, agricultural subsidies,21 7 land and forest conservation
payments 218 and unemployment compensation 2 19 are all included
in the gross income of their recipients. 220 Some direct expendi-
tures, however, are only partly taxable; a designated percentage
of the social security benefits received during the taxable year
must be included in a recipient's gross income under certain cir-
cumstances. 22 1  Other direct expenditures-such as food
stamps, 222 housing vouchers223 and certain pay to members of the
armed forces- 224are specifically excluded from gross income.
In contrast to direct expenditures, most tax expenditures are
not included in the gross income of the beneficiary. When a non-
taxable tax expenditure is structured as a deduction or an exclu-
sion, it is worth more to the high-bracket taxpayer than to the
lower-bracket taxpayer. 22 5 A tax credit is also more valuable to a
liance on perceptions to justify a substantive tax provision is disturbing." Id. at
98.
217. I.R.C. § 61 (CCH 1993).
218. Id.
219. I.R.C. § 85(a)-(b).
220. See SURREY, supra note 1, at 137 (stating that "[m]ost direct Govern-
ment economic assistance for business activities is given on a before-tax basis and
in one way or another enters as a plus in the income accounts of the person
benefitted").
221. For taxable years beginning in 1994, the 1993 Tax Act establishes a
two-tier system for taxing Social Security benefits. I.R.C. § 86 (CCH 1993), en-
acted by OBRA 1993 § 13215, 107 Stat. at 475-77. First, the present tax on 50%
of the benefits for individuals with income above existing thresholds is retained.
Id. Second, a new tax on 85% of the benefits for individuals with incomes above
higher threshold amounts is added. Id.
222. See Rev. Rul. 74-74, 1974-1 C.B. 18, 19 (stating that "disbursements
from a general welfare fund in the interest of the general public which are not
made for services rendered are not includable in gross income") (citations
omitted).
223. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 153; see also Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1
C.B. 21 (stating that "replacement housing payments made prior to January 2,
1971, pursuant to the 1968 Act are not includable in the gross income of the
recipient").
224. I.R.C. § 112(a)-(b) (CCH 1993). Although Congress excludes some
direct expenditures from gross income, the benefit of the tax exclusion for mili-
tary allowances and other governmental benefits is probably taken into account
by Congress when establishing the payment levels. BiTKER & LOKKEN, supra
note 25, at 3.3.3, 3-30. Thus, if Congress were to repeal the exclusions, it
would most likely compensate the recipients by increasing the amount of such
benefits. Id. However, there would still be an impact to the extent that the mar-
ginal tax rates of the recipients differ. Id.
225. For discussion of the true value of a tax preference, see MARVIN A.
CIHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 356 (6th ed. 1991). Chirelstein argues
that the market for tax preferences does not work perfectly and, thus, there is
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high-bracket taxpayer because "the credit is, in effect, after-tax
income and is therefore equivalent to a larger amount of regular
income to the higher tax bracket recipient."2 26 Thus, equity is-
sues concern and surround both tax and direct expenditure
programs.
These inequities can be remedied by including the tax expen-
diture (or direct expenditure) in gross income either directly or
indirectly through the basis reduction mechanism. Indeed, many
of the tax credits in the Internal Revenue Code are taxable. For
example, section 87 requires the amount of the alcohol fuel credit
to be included in income. 227 To the extent that an employer uses
the targeted jobs tax credit provision, he is required to reduce the
deduction for wages by the amount of the credit. 22 8 The result is
the same as if the credit amount was included in the tax base and
a full deduction for wages was allowed. 229 The present tax treat-
ment for a tax expenditure that is analogous to a direct govern-
ment contribution to capital is not to include it in income directly
but rather to reduce the basis of property related to the contribu-
tion.230 Thus, a taxpayer utilizing the rehabilitation tax credit
must reduce the basis of the building by the amount of the reha-
bilitation tax credit. 23 '
The low-income housing credit appears to be partly taxable
because of the use of an after-tax interest rate in the low-income
housing credit formula.232 For example, an after-tax interest rate
of 5.85% generates a seventy percent present value credit of
some loss of equity among taxpayers. Id. at 361-62; see also SURREY, supra note 1,
at 50 (discussing effects of tax expenditures on taxes paid). Note that a nontax-
able direct expenditure is also more valuable to the high-bracket taxpayer than
to the lower-bracket taxpayer.
226. Jerome Kurtz, Tax Incentives: Their Use and Misuse, 20 ,YAJOR TAX PLAN.
1, 8 (1968).
227. I.R.C. § 87 (CCH 1993); see also I.R.C. § 40(a) (determining amount of
alcohol fuel credit that must be included as income).
228. Id. § 280C(a).
229. Paul McDaniel, Identification of the "Tax" in "Effective Tax Rates, " "Tax
Reform," and "Tax Equity, " 38 NAT'L TAX J. 273, 278 (1985).
230. Basis reduction in lieu of income inclusion is also the tax law treat-
ment for direct expenditure grants designed as contributions to capital rather
than as operating subsidies. See SURREY, supra note 1, at 329 n.3 7 ; see also I.R.C.
§§ 118, 362(c) (CCH 1993); Thomas L. Evans, The Taxation of Nonshareholder Con-
tributions to Capital: An Economic Analysis, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1457 (1992) (providing
critical analysis of current tax treatment of nonshareholder contributions to
capital).
231. I.R.C. § 50(c)(1) (CCH 1993); see also McDaniel, supra note 229, at 275.
232. For a description of the formula used to calculate the credit rate, see
supra note 45.
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8.92%. By substituting a pre-tax interest rate of 8.13%,233 the
formula yields a seventy percent present value credit of 9.77%.234
Because this equals a 7% after-tax credit, 235 as compared to the
8.92% credit computed using the after-tax interest rate, the use
of an after-tax interest rate in the formula results in a partly taxa-
ble credit. Thus, in effect, an 8% tax is being paid on the
credit. 236
In order to accommodate tax policy concerns, the low-in-
come housing credit should be made completely taxable instead
of inappropriately using the passive activity, general business
credit and alternative minimum tax provisions to accomplish the
goal of ensuring tax equity. 23 7 Because the low-income housing
credit is analogous to a direct government contribution to capital,
the proper tax treatment is to reduce the basis of the low-income
housing credit property.2 3 8 Moreover, because adjusting the
property's basis annually as the credit is received seems unduly
complex, perhaps in the case of the seventy percent present value
credit, the depreciable basis should simply be reduced by seventy
percent.23 9
In general, there will be no effect on an individual taxpayer's
income until the low-income housing investment is sold because
the passive activity rules usually restrict individual taxpayers from
deducting depreciation expenses. 240 At the point of sale, the ba-
233. 5.85/(1 - .28) = the pre-tax interest rate of 8.13 %.
234. (.70 x .0813)/[(1.0813 - 1/(1.0813)' = 9.7%. For a description of
the formula used to calculate the credit rate, see supra note 45.
235. 9.7 x (1-.28) = 7% after-tax.
236. 8.92/9.7 = 92%. Thus, the tax rate equals 8%.
237. Taxation of the tax credit is unnecessary, however, if one believes that
the tax preference for low-income housing credit investments is fully capitalized.
The low-income housing credit is fully capitalized when investors pay a sufficient
premium for the after-tax income such that the yield equals that of a comparable
taxable investment taking into consideration liquidity, risk, etc. For a discussion
of capitalization, see infra notes 242-55 and accompanying text.
238. For a discussion of nonshareholder contributions to capital, see Evans,
supra note 230.
239. In the case of the 30% present value credit, the depreciable basis
should be reduced by 30%. Note that the annual credit amount provides a
stream of benefits with a net present value of either 70% or 30% of the basis
attributable to qualifying low-income units, depending on the type of low-in-
come housing expenditure. See BLUEBOOK, supra note 45. A remaining question,
however, is whether the interest rate used in the formula-the average of the
annual AFR for mid-term and long-term obligations-is appropriate? For a de-
scription of the formula used to calculate the credit percentage, see supra note
45 and accompanying text.
240. For a discussion of amendments to the passive activity rules, see supra
note 186 and accompanying text.
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sis reduction will play a role in calculating gain or loss on the sale
or exchange of the asset. As most corporate taxpayers are not
subject to the passive activity rules, the basis reduction will have
an immediate effect on the taxable income of the corporation by
virtue of reduced depreciation deductions. However, in both
cases, Congress will need to increase the rate of the tax credit in
order to provide the same after-tax rate of return that it intended
when it created the credit in 1986.241 Once the low-income hous-
ing credit is explicitly taxable through the mechanism of basis re-
duction, there is no justification for the passive activity, general
business credit or alternative minimum tax provisions with re-
spect to the credit. These limitations on the use of the low-in-
come housing credit should therefore be repealed.
The restrictions on the use of the low-income housing credit
are also unjustified if this tax expenditure is proven to be fully
capitalized. If the investor in low-income housing credit proper-
ties has paid adequate implicit taxes, 242 then horizontal and verti-
cal equity issues have already been resolved.2 43 The market
responds to under-measurement of taxable income from a partic-
ular investment with increased demand for the tax-preferred in-
vestment at the expense of demand for alternative uses of
funds. 244 Because the low-income housing credit yields after-tax
241. The basic objective in the design of the low-income housing credit
formula was to compensate the future investor for the loss of the tax incentives
that existed in the pre-1986 Internal Revenue Code, such as special accelerated
depreciation, five-year amortization of certain rehabilitation expenditures and
special deductions for interest and taxes paid during the construction period.
For further discussion of the basic objectives underlying the low-income housing
credit, see supra notes 61-63. The formula was also designed to give a 28%
bracket taxpayer sufficient incentive to attract his investment in low-income
housing when compared to alternative investments. Telephone Interview with
Professor Andrew Lyon, formerly staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
1985-1987, staff member of the Council of Economic Advisors (August 27,
1992). Thus, the goal was to design a credit formula that would generate an
after-tax rate of return for investment in low-income housing credit properties
that was competitive with alternative investments. Id. Given this goal, if the tax
credit had originally been taxable, then the formula would have been adjusted to
increase the rate so that the same incentive effect would be achieved. Id.
242. For a more detailed discussion of implicit taxes, see infra note 267.
243. Horizontal equity refers to the principle that similarly situated taxpay-
ers should be taxed similarly. For a more detailed discussion of horizontal and
vertical equity principles, see CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 225, at 359.
244. Shaviro, supra note 167, at 1221-22 (stating that "[p]reference capitali-
zation is a result of market responses to the prescribed under-measurement of
taxable income from a particular investment"); see also BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra
note 25, at 3.3.3, 3-27 to 3-28 (analyzing congressional effort to stimulate in-
vestment in equipment by providing tax treatment for equipment costs that ef-
fectively exempts income from such property from tax); Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
914 [Vol. 38: p. 871
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income, investors will be willing to pay a premium for this tax-
exempt stream of income. This premium lowers the yield on the
investment when compared to an identical taxable stream of in-
come; such sacrificed yield is considered an implicit tax
payment.245
If the low-income housing credit is fully capitalized, the after-
tax return for taxpayers in the same tax bracket is identical re-
gardless of whether they invest in this tax-preferred asset or in
some other taxable asset. This satisfies horizontal equity con-
cerns because similarly situated taxpayers are being treated alike.
Furthermore, if the tax expenditure is fully capitalized, it does not
violate vertical equity either. The progressivity of the rate struc-
ture will be unaffected if a 15% taxpayer who invests $1000 in a
taxable instrument yielding $100 pays tax of $15 whereas a 31%
taxpayer invests the same amount in an instrument that only
yields after-tax income of $69. The 311% taxpayer has paid an
implicit tax of $31 equal to the sacrificed yield, so that the vertical
relationship (15%/317%) between high- and low-bracket taxpay-
ers is preserved despite the tax credit. Thus, the progressivity of
the rate structure is unaffected and vertical equity concerns are
satisfied.2 46 This phenomenon only occurs, however, when all the
tax-exempt instruments are purchased by investors subject to the
highest marginal rate of tax. 247
The problem is discerning whether the low-income housing
credit has been fully capitalized. Under the compressed tax rate
schedule in effect for the 1991 and 1992 tax years, 248 it appeared
Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAX LAw. 549, 563-64
(1985) (discussing market adjustments to tax arbitrage in general, and consider-
ing certain financial assets and effect of graduated tax rates).
245. For a more detailed discussion of implicit taxes, see infra note 267.
246. For further discussion of how vertical equity concerns are satisfied, see
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 225, at 359; Warren, supra note 244, at 559-60; and
Warren, supra note 97, at 990-91.
247. For a discussion of who invests in low-income housing credit projects,
see infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text. See also Boris I. Bittker, Equity,
Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 19, 26-27
(Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980) (stating that "[i]f the trickle-up
theory is valid, an upside-down subsidy (that is, one that goes exclusively to tax-
payers subject to the highest marginal tax rate) causes a misallocation of re-
sources but no vertical inequity").
248. I.R.C. § 1 (CCH 1992) (prior to amendment by OBRA 1993 § 13201,
107 Stat. at 457-61). For the 1991 and 1992 tax years, the tax rate schedule
contained only three brackets: 15%; 28%; and 31%. Id. For the 1993 tax year,
the 1993 Tax Act adds a 36% bracket and a surtax on taxpayers with taxable
incomes greater than $250,000, which results in an additional 39.6% bracket.
I.R.C. § 1 (1993), enacted by OBRA 1993 § 13201, 107 Stat. at 457-61.
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that the benefits of tax-exempt bonds were partially capitalized.
For 31% tax bracket taxpayers, tax-exempt bonds only yielded
after-tax returns fourteen percent higher than comparable taxa-
ble financial instruments.2 49 However, it is difficult to determine
empirically the extent of capitalization of the low-income housing
credit because there is no similar taxable investment that would
permit the direct comparison of yields that is possible with taxa-
ble and tax-exempt bonds. 250
In order for the market to work perfectly, however, top
bracket taxpayers must acquire all the low-income housing credit
investments. Otherwise, the credit investments must be priced to
attract lower bracket investors, leaving a residual windfall for
those in the highest brackets. 251 Based on statistics of income
data, one may reasonably assume that taxpayers in the 28% tax
bracket as well as the highest tax bracket are investing in low-
249. The yield on AA ten-year obligation tax-exempt bonds was 5.4% on
November 24, 1992. Anita Raghavan, Yield Comparisons, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25,
1992, at C19. The yield on similarly rated 1-10 year taxable corporate bonds
was 6.87% on the same day, which after adjusting for a 31% marginal income
tax rate, is 4.74%-almost 88% of the tax-exempt yield. Id. For a taxpayer in
the 28% marginal income tax bracket, the after-tax yield is 4.95%-almost 92%
of the tax-exempt yield. Id.; see also Shaviro, supra note 167, at 1230-31 (stating
that tax-exempt bonds now offer many taxpayers approximately same after-tax
return as similar taxable financial instruments). But cf. George Cooper, The Tam-
ing of the Shrewd Identifying And Controlling Income Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
657, 698-701 (1985). Professor Cooper argues that it does not make sense to
compare the implicit tax on exempt bonds to the ordinary income tax rate when
high tax bracket investors have so many lower rate opportunities available to
them. Id. at 698-701. He suggests a comparison to the maximum capital gains
rate or other low-taxed investment alternatives that are the real options for ex-
empt-bond investors. Id. at 699. Judged against these rates, Professor Cooper
would find that exempt bonds are subject to a competitive level of taxation. Id.
Professor Yorio rebuts Cooper's assertion by pointing out that for many
taxpayers, income consists solely or primarily of salary or other earned income.
Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 395, 401 (1987). Because the implicit tax on tax-exempt bonds is lower
than the highest marginal tax bracket, purchasers of these bonds receive a tax
advantage compared to taxpayers with salary or other earned income. Id.
250. Specifically, in order to make a valid comparison, the low-income
housing credit investment and taxable investment must be equally risky and liq-
uid. For a discussion of the relationship between the risk of an investment and
an investor's indifference curve, see JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND Ap-
PLICATIONS 70-71 (1992).
25 1. Susan Ackerman & David Ott, An Analysis of the Revenue Effects of Pro-
posed Substitutes for Tax Exemption of State and Local Bonds, 23 NAT'L TAxJ. 397, 398-
99 (1970); see also CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 225, at 360-61. But cf. Cooper, supra
note 249, at 699. Professor Cooper argues that exempt bonds are priced as
favorably as they are relative to taxable ones because they must compete in a
market rich with tax-reduction opportunities rather than because the exempt
bonds must attract lower bracket investors. Id.
916 [Vol. 38: p. 871
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss4/1
THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING CREDIT
income housing credit projects.252 The investor examples in the
prospectuses for low-income housing credit investments make it
clear that they are targeting investors in the 28% tax bracket. 253
Finally, corporations that are in the 34% tax bracket invest in
credit projects.254 Thus, because all low-income housing credit
investments were not being purchased by corporations-the in-
vestors in the highest marginal tax bracket before 1993-one can
presume, theoretically, that the low-income housing credit is not
fully capitalized. 255 The implicit taxes that are paid on low-in-
come housing credit investments mitigate the equity concerns,
but making the credit taxable should eliminate these concerns.
b. Solving the Perception Problem
As tax expenditure analysis demonstrates, all that should be
necessary to eliminate tax policy concerns is to treat tax expendi-
tures correctly for income measurement purposes. Unfortu-
252. For 1990, 26,695 individual income tax returns with adjusted gross
incomes of between $45,000 and $1,000,000 claimed low-income housing cred-
its. STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (unpublished
information for Tax Year 1990). One may reasonably assume that these returns
reflect taxpayers in both the 28% and 33% tax brackets. Under the rate struc-
ture from 1988 through 1990, there were only two brackets, one at a 15% tax
rate, and the other at a 28% tax rate. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 35-36. As a
taxpayer's income exceeded a certain threshold, however, the benefits of the
15% rate and personal exemptions were phased-out. Id. These benefits were
phased-out by imposing an extra tax of 5% until the benefits of the 15% tax
bracket and personal exemptions were eliminated. Id. This produced a 33%
marginal rate over a certain range of income that varied among taxpayers. Id.
For the 1991 and 1992 tax years, the tax rate schedule contained three tax
brackets: 15%; 28%; and 31%. I.R.C. § 1 (CCH 1992) (prior to amendment by
OBRA 1993 § 13201, 107 Stat. at 457-61). For tax years after 1992, there are
two additional tax brackets: 36% and 39.6%. I.R.C. § 1 (CCH 1993).
253. See BOSTON CAPITAL SERVICES, INC., BOSTON CAPITAL TAx CREDIT
FUND III L.P. (July 1, 1992) (providing examples of prospectuses for low-income
housing credit investments); BOSTON FINANCIAL SECURITIES, INC., BOSTON FI-
NANCIAL QUALIFIED HOUSING TAX CREDITS L.P. III (November 23, 1988) (same).
254. For taxable years beginning after 1992, the 1993 Tax Act adds a new
35% tax bracket for corporations with taxable income greater than $10,000,000.
I.R.C. § 11 (CCH 1993), enacted by OBRA 1993 § 13221, 107 Stat. at 477. The
benefit of the 34% bracket is phased-out through the use of a 38% bracket for
corporate taxpayers with taxable incomes between $15,000,000 and
$18,333,333. Id.
255. See Shaviro, supra note 167, at 1231 (noting that "commentators have
identified [numerous] factors that continue to impede full preference capitaliza-
tion .. . [including] market inefficiency, variations in the elasticity of the supply
of tax-favored assets, the lapse of time before markets adjust to tax law changes,
and the existence of international markets"); see also Stanley A. Koppelman, Tax
Arbitrage and the Interest Deduction, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1146, 1184-85 (1988); War-
ren, supra note 244, at 564-65; Paul R. McDaniel, The Relevance of Federal Tax
Reform, 32 NAT'L TAxJ. 406, 409 (1979).
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nately, however, the public becomes outraged when it learns that
an individual or a corporation has paid no income taxes.256 After
release of the IRS's income statistics for 1987,257 a headline in the
Wall Street Journal read: "IRS Says 472 Rich People Didn't Pay
Taxes in 1988."258 Data depicting high-income families paying
no taxes undermines public confidence in the tax system. In a
voluntary tax system like the U.S. regime, widespread perceptions
of tax inequity could lead to serious compliance problems.2 59
256. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT
Gucci GULCH 12 (1987) (describing public outcry following publication of 1984
Citizens for Tax Justice study by Robert McIntyre that demonstrated that 128
out of 250 of largest corporations paid no federal income taxes for at least one
year between 1981 and 1983); see also Steven M. Sheffrin, Perceptions of Fairness in
the Crucible of Tax Policy, in TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1993).
257. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 requires the annual publication of data
on individuals with high incomes including the number who did not pay any
income tax. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2123, 90 Stat. 1520,
1915-16. The data must illustrate the significance of various tax provisions in
making those individuals nontaxable. Id. The high-income tax return data is
required to be selected and classified on the basis of two different definitions of
income: adjusted gross income (AGI) and expanded income. Id., amended by
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 441, 98 Stat. 494, 815.
Expanded income is defined as AGI plus certain tax preferences less invest-
ment expenses not exceeding investment income. STATISTICS OF INCOME DiVi-
SION, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 1988 67-74
(1991) [hereinafter TAX RETURNS-1988]. The tax preferences that were consid-
ered for 1988 were those items that comprise the alternative minimum tax base
such as the excess of accelerated over straight-line depreciation on some prop-
erty and unrealized gain on the exercise of stock options. Id. Because expanded
income is based on tax return data, it includes those tax expenditures that can be
found on Form 6251, Alternative Minimum Tax Computation, and tax-exempt
interest income from state and local government bonds. Id. But the expanded
income concept excludes other tax expenditures such as the value of most em-
ployee fringe benefits. Id. Itemized deductions are also not taken into consider-
ation for the purposes of either expanded income or AGI. Id.
258. IRS Says 472 Rich People Didn't Pay Taxes in 1988, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1,
1990, at A24.
259. Richard Gephardt & Elaine G. Bryant, The Fair Tax Act: A Plan for a
Simple, Fair, and Economically Rational Tax, 12 NOTRE DAME J. LEGIS. 129, 131
(1985) ("It is clear that taxpayer perceptions of an unjust and inequitable tax
system contribute to the increasing level of noncompliance."); David I. Kempler,
Transitional Rules as a Tool for Effective Tax Reform, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 765, 770
(1984) ("For many taxpayers, the complexity of the system, and its perceived
unfairness encourage them to play the 'audit lottery' by failing to report income,
by overstating deductions, or by taking aggressive positions on disputed tax is-
sues."); Dean Phypers, A Businessman's View of Tax Reform, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 285,
285 (1985) ("[T]he perception of fairness, in a system of voluntary compliance, is
critical.").
Although the above commentators blame public perceptions of tax inequity
for the decline in income tax compliance during the 1980's, other commentators
assert that the decrease in compliance can be accounted for by the decrease in
auditing over the same period. Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., Penny-Wise and Pound-
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Concern over public perceptions of tax inequity continue to be an
important consideration today. For example, data on the effec-
tive tax rates paid by individuals played a key role in the fiscal year
1991 budget debate.260 Thus, it is imperative that the public un-
derstand how these effective tax rates are computed.26'
Professor McDaniel's theory is that tax expenditures do not
erode the tax base.
The check which the taxpayer actually sends to the
government is generally thought of as the taxpayer's tax
liability. But, as tax expenditure analysis makes clear, the
amount of the check is not the taxpayer's "tax" at all. It
is simply a number which represents the net of the tax-
payer's tax on economic income minus the sum of the
subsidies delivered through the tax system for which the
taxpayer has qualified. As such, the amount of the check
paid by the taxpayer has no particular economic or pol-
Foolish: New Estimates of the Impact of Audits on Revenue, 35 TAx NOTES 787, 789-90
(1987) (stating that "estimates imply that the entire estimated increase in indi-
vidual noncompliance during the 1975-1985 period is much more than ac-
counted for by the decrease in auditing over the same period, other things
equal"); see also Steven E. Kaplan & Philip M.J. Reckers, A Study of Tax Evasion
Judgments, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 97, 102 (1985) (arguing that taxpayer attitudes to-
wards compliance are not significantly affected by perceptions of fairness);
Shaviro, supra note 216, at 98-99 (stating that "there is little evidence that the
public's level of concern about tax avoidance was great enough to influence be-
havior significantly"). Professor Zelinsky asserts that "[i]f there is a problem, it
is that the federal government is selectively subsidizing some persons and not
others, not the form in which the subsidy is occurring." Zelinsky, supra note 5, at
1028.
260. For purposes of summarizing the distributional effects by income cate-
gory of OBRA 1990, the Joint Committee on Taxation added such tax expendi-
tures as tax-exempt interest, employer contributions for health plans and life
insurance, nontaxable social security and workers' compensation to adjusted
gross income. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARY OF
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS, BY INCOME CATEGORY (Comm. Print 1990). Direct
subsidies such as Medicare, housing assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children and food stamps were ignored. Id.; see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
103D CONG., IST. SESS., METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING CHANGES IN
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS 2 (Comm. Print 1993) (explaining why Joint
Committee on Taxation staff does not pursue more comprehensive approach of
reflecting both direct and tax expenditures). See generally Senator William V.
Roth, Jr., What's Missing in the Budget Debate? Accurate Information, 49 TAX NOTES
577 (1990) (calling into question accuracy of Joint Committee data).
261. See generally THOMAS A. BARTHOLD ET AL., COMPARISON OF THE DISTRI-
BUTION METHODOLOGIES OF THE CBO, THE JCT, AND THE OTA (1993) (paper
submitted to American Enterprise Institute Conference on Distributional Analy-
sis for Making Tax Policy); PATRICK J. WILKIE, TAX FOUNDATION BACKGROUND
PAPER #2: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TAX DISTRIBUTION STUDIES CONDUCTED BY
THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 1-3 (1992) (reviewing empirical methods
used by Congressional Budget Office to calculate effective tax rates).
1993] 919
49
Kaye: Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
icy significance; it is simply a number that has resulted
from the subtraction process required by the tax expen-
diture mechanism. 262
The thrust of McDaniel's article is that there is a conceptual
inconsistency between tax expenditure analysis and effective tax
rate analysis. "Under the former, the 'tax' is the taxpayer's liabil-
ity based on economic income; under the latter, the 'tax' is the
amount of the check a taxpayer remits to the government." 263 Ef-
fective tax rate analysis starts with the amount of the check the
taxpayer sends in and divides it by economic income to derive an
average effective tax rate. According to tax expenditure analysis,
the average effective tax rate is a meaningless number because
many tax expenditures have been added back to the denominator
to arrive at "economic income" but have been excluded from the
numerator. Thus, the effective tax rate analysis is using an "eco-
nomic income" concept but not an "economic tax liability"
concept. 264
Tax expenditures in fiscal 1993 are estimated at $354 bil-
lion.2 65 If these tax expenditures were replaced with direct ex-
penditures designed to place the taxpayers in the same after-tax
position, the effective tax rates of these identically situated tax-
payers would be dramatically increased even though there would
be absolutely no change in their economic position. 266 Obvi-
ously, present effective tax rate analyses are misleading. The fol-
lowing examples illustrate this point.
Assume that an individual with other taxable income of
$1,000, purchases $100 of health insurance. In example A, there
is a ten percent tax credit available with respect to the purchase.
In example B, the credit is replaced with a direct expenditure
equal to ten percent of the cost of the health insurance. Neither
the tax expenditure nor the direct expenditure is subject to tax.
262. For a discussion of the theory that tax expenditures do not erode the
tax base, see McDaniel, supra note 229, at 273.
263. Id. at 274.
264. Id. at 273-74.
265. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., ESTIMATES OF FED-
ERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1993-1997 11-17 (Comm. Print
1992).
266. See McDaniel, supra note 229, at 274.
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The effective tax rate results under each alternative are as follows:
A B
Nontaxable Nontaxable
Tax Expenditure Direct Expenditure
(1) Income $1,000 $1,000
(2) Subsidy 10 10
(3) Economic Income $1,010 $1,010
(4) Taxable Income $1,000 $1,000
(5) Tax (20%) $200 $200
(6) Tax Credit -10 0
(7) Tax Liability $190 $200
(8) Effective Tax Rate
((7)-(3)) 19% 20%
(9) Tax Expenditure Analysis
((5)-(3)) 20% 20%
The taxpayer is in an identical economic position in both ex-
amples A and B; in each case, he has economic income of $1,010.
Yet the effective tax rate analysis shows a higher effective tax rate
when the taxpayer receives the direct expenditure. This analysis
overlooks the fact that by using a tax expenditure, economically,
the taxpayer has written a $200 check to one branch of the Treas-
ury and received a $10 check back from another branch of the
Treasury. This same result occurs mechanically in the direct ex-
penditure approach. Thus, to show a nineteen percent effective
tax rate for the taxpayer receiving the tax credit is incorrect be-
cause it adds the implicit Treasury check to economic income but
fails to give the taxpayer credit for the implicit tax payment.2 67
All that should be necessary to eliminate tax policy concerns
is to treat tax expenditures correctly for income measurement
purposes. However, even when a tax expenditure is included in
taxable income, effective tax rate analysis shows a higher effective
rate for a direct expenditure program.2 68 Returning to the pre-
ceding example, assume that both the tax credit and the direct
267. Because of tax benefits providing either an exclusion, credit, reduced
rate or deferral of taxation, individuals may be willing to accept lower rates of
return on investments yielding this tax-preferred income. In effect, the reduc-
tion in potential income is an implicit tax on that income-foregone income in
lieu of ordinary tax. The implicit tax is equal to the amount by which income has
been reduced because of the availability of tax preferences. See TAX RETURNS-
1988, supra note 257, at 71; see also McDaniel, supra note 255, at 409.
268. For a general discussion of effective tax rates, see McDaniel, supra note
229, at 275.
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expenditure are subject to tax. The effective tax rate results
under each alternative are as follows:
A B
Taxable Taxable
Tax Expenditure Direct Expenditure
(1) Income $1,000 $1,000
(2) Subsidy 10 10
(3) Economic Income $1,010 $1,010
(4) Taxable Income $1,010 $1,010
(5) Tax (20%) $202 $202
(6) Tax Credit -10 0
(7) Tax Liability _ TO92 $202
(8) Effective Tax Rate
((7)-(3)) 19% 20%
(9) Tax Expenditure Analysis
((5)(3)) 20
Perceptions of equity are very important to a self-assessed
tax. 269 The Treasury influences those perceptions by the manner
in which it presents data on high-income individuals. For exam-
ple, the Treasury report on high-income taxpayers makes no
mention of the tax expenditure concept. 270 It does discuss the
concept of implicit taxes and acknowledges that the reporting of
fully taxable and tax-preferred income is not consistent. 27 1 Ac-
cording to the report: "Fully taxable income is being reported on
a pre-tax basis, whereas tax-preferred income is being shown on
an after-tax basis." 2 72 The Treasury made no attempt, however,
to measure implicit taxes or to gross up incomes to reflect the
value of implicit taxes. Thus, both taxes paid and gross income
are understated because of the implicit taxes on tax-preferred
income. 273
The Treasury report does present two different treatments of
the foreign tax credit: 1) as an item of tax preference; and 2) as a
269. SeeJane G. Gravelle, Comments on Al. Graetz and E. Sunle v, Minimum Taxes
and Comprehensive Tax Reform, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID
INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 419, 423 (1988). According to Gravelle, "percep-
tion of equity can be very important to a self-assessed tax. Moreover, the per-
ception of unfair treatment can alter welfare as well as the reality. It seems
important, however, to consider carefully the events that led to these percep-
tions, particularly when discussing the corporate minimum tax." Id. For a dis-
cussion of the perception issue, see supra notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
270. For an example of the Treasury report on high-income individuals, see
TAx RETURNS-1988, supra note 257.
271. Id. at 71.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 71-72.
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tax on income.274 Thus, one set of tables includes, as taxes, only
U.S. income taxes net of the foreign tax credits. The Treasury
decided, however, that if all income taxes were considered-U.S.
as well as foreign income taxes-a more accurate measure of the
tax burden would result. Therefore, to present a more realistic
picture of the number of nontaxable, high-income taxpayers and
the reasons they are nontaxable, the Treasury prepared alterna-
tive tables that redefine income tax liability to consist of the total
amount of U.S. income taxes (income taxes after credits plus the
alternative minimum tax) plus the amount of foreign tax cred-
its.2 7 5 For similar reasons, the Treasury should also prepare al-
ternative tables consistent with the tax expenditure concept.
Presenting such alternative tables will require a new defini-
tion of "tax expenditures" or at least a new category of tax ex-
penditures that are clearly not part of the system of measuring
taxable income and tax burden. 276 As Professor Thuronyi points
out, preparing tax burden distribution tables that disregard tax
274. Id. at 75.
275. Id.
276. The current list of tax expenditures remains plagued with controversy.
See Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22
NAT'L TAxJ. 244, 261 (1969); Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The Tax
Expenditure Budget - Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAXJ. 528, 536 (1969); see
also Boris I. Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget - A Reply to Professors Surrey and
Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAxJ. 538 (1969) (arguing that there are deficiencies causing
proposed tax expenditure budget to be incomplete and misleading); Michael J.
McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 79 (1980) (offering "methodology for identifying tax expenditures which
bypasses entirely problem of obtaining consensus on the features of the normal
tax structure"); compare Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation - Tax Expenditure
or Proper Allowancefor Measuring Net Income?, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1979) (arguing
that accelerated depreciation is proper allowance for measuring net income and
should not be classified as tax expenditure) and Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated De-
preciation Revisited-A Reply to Professor Blum, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (1980)
(stating that "accelerated depreciation is no less tax neutral than straight line
depreciation .... Congress's choice of the permissible methods of depreciation
therefore should turn exclusively on policy considerations.") with Walter J.
Blum, Accelerated Depreciation: A Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?!!, 78
MICH. L. REV. 1172 (1980) (concluding that accelerated depreciation cannot be
justified by the neutrality principle); and compare Paul McDaniel, The Tax Expendi-
ture Concept: Theory and Practical Effects, 8 TAX NOTES 587 (1979) (stating that tax
expenditures can be classified into consistent, identifiable categories) with Nor-
man B. Ture, Ture's Unreleased Testimony on Tax Expenditures, 13 TAx NOTES 1535
(1981) (arguing that tax expenditures and exceptions are arbitrarily defined);
and compare William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972) (stating that medical expense and charitable contribu-
tion deductions are part of aggregate personal consumption, not tax expendi-
tures) with SURREY, supra note 1, at 20 (questioning Andrews' analysis).
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expenditures will sometimes produce misleading results.277 He
presents, as a hypothetical example, Congress repealing the de-
duction for home mortgage interest and then reducing tax rates
proportionately. 27 8 Currently, the distribution tables would show
no change. Under McDaniel's approach, however, the tables
would show a sharp reduction in tax for wealthier taxpayers, as
the pre-change tax burden would not reflect the deduction for
home mortgage interest. 279
The result under McDaniel's approach is appropriate if the
deduction for home mortgage interest is a substitute for a direct
expenditure. 280 Conversely, if the deduction is a component of
the tax rate structure (rates would be intentionally set lower if this
deduction were not allowed), the result is inappropriate and the
current distribution tables are correct. Thus, in order to prepare
meaningful tax burden distribution tables, it is necessary to define
a narrow class of tax expenditures that are clearly a substitute for
direct expenditures.
Thuronyi develops a concept called substitutable tax provi-
sions-tax provisions "whose purposes a non-tax-based federal
program can achieve at least as effectively." 28' While there are
probably many ways to define this list, any tax expenditure moti-
vated by both tax and subsidy purposes must remain in the tax
burden distribution tables. For example, the fiscal year 1991
budget debate demonstrated that a reduction of the total amount
of itemized deductions allowed to taxpayers with adjusted gross
incomes in excess of $100,000 is implicitly considered by Con-
gress to be a substitute for a rate increase. 28 2 Thus, to create an
277. Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 88 DUKE L.J. 1155,
1199 (1988).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1200.
280. For further discussion of McDaniel's approach, see McDaniel, supra
note 229, at 276-77.
281. Thuronyi, supra note 277, at 1156. Professor Thuronyi developed the
substitutable tax provision concept "to facilitate the replacement of tax expendi-
tures with non-tax-based programs and to guide budgetary choices between tax-
based and non-tax-based assistance." Id. at 1186. I borrow Thuronyi's concept
for a different purpose-to facilitate the production of information that will pre-
vent tax policy concerns from inappropriately interfering with the implementa-
tion of social policy.
282. I.R.C. § 68(b) (CCH 1992), enacted by OBRA 1990 § 11103(a), 104
Stat. at 1388-406. In lieu of an approximately one percent rate increase, OBRA
1990 used a reduction of the total amount of itemized deductions that a taxpayer
with adjusted gross income in excess of $100,000 could deduct. Id. Itemized
deductions (other than medical expenses, casualty and theft losses, and invest-
ment interest) are reduced by an amount equal to three percent of the amount
924 [Vol. 38: p. 871
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alternative list, it will be necessary to cull through current tax ex-
penditure lists and select those items that can clearly be consid-
ered substitutes for direct expenditure programs.
Congress should begin this process by requiring the Treas-
ury to make the appropriate adjustments for tax credits-the
most obvious substitutes for direct expenditure programs. Taxa-
ble credits like the targeted jobs tax credit need only be added
back to the amount of "tax" to determine the "economic tax lia-
bility." Nontaxable credits like the low-income housing credit
would require adjustments to both the income and tax amounts.
As the low-income housing credit is essentially tax-preferred in-
come, both taxes paid and gross income are understated because
of the implicit taxes on tax-preferred income. Once the housing
credit is made fully taxable, however, the market will adjust and
investors will no longer pay implicit taxes. For ease in prepara-
tion of the tax burden tables, the substitutable tax provisions that
are structured as deductions or exclusions should be reformu-
lated as taxable credits.28 3 By the affirmative action of restructur-
ing a tax expenditure as a taxable credit, Congress will also
explicitly acknowledge that the provision should be treated as a
direct expenditure program for all purposes.
Because of the important policy implications, one must rec-
ognize the conceptual inconsistency between tax expenditure
analysis and effective tax rate analysis. 28 4 Effective tax rate analy-
sis should treat as the "tax" the amount of the liability that would
be due if statutory rates were applied to economic income. The
amount of tax due pursuant to a taxpayer's tax return is irrelevant
because it is simply a number that has resulted from the subtrac-
tion process required by the tax expenditure mechanism. 28 5
Thus, tax expenditures should have no impact on effective tax
rates; effective tax rate analyses that imply to the contrary are de-
of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income in excess of $100,000. Id.; see also 136
CONG. REC. S15,711 (daily ed., Oct. 18, 1990) ("Thus, the Committee believes
that the goal of personalizing the Federal income tax based on each individual's
ability to pay taxes is enhanced by adoption of a rule that imposes some limita-
tion on deductibility of amounts paid.., by high-income individuals, yet gener-
ally allows full deductibility at the margin.").
283. Reformulating the substitutable tax provisions as taxable credits will
also remedy a fairness problem. Tax expenditures structured as deductions, ex-
clusions or nontaxable credits result in the value of the benefit increasing with
the recipient's marginal tax rate. For a discussion of the effect that tax expendi-
tures have on effective tax rates, see supra note 267 and accompanying text.
284. For a discussion of the perception problems caused by the current ef-
fective tax rate analyses, see supra notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
285. McDaniel, supra note 229, at 273.
9251993]
55
Kaye: Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
fective both in concept and in policy implications.2 8 6 The imposi-
tion of the alternative minimum tax is an unfortunate outgrowth
of these effective tax rate analyses and the perception problems
that they caused.
The minimum tax has also historically been used as a back-
door means of trimming tax expenditures. There are many exam-
ples where an attempt to repeal a tax expenditure has resulted in
compromise-inclusion of the expenditure in the minimum tax
base.2 87 As one commentator stated: "The minimum tax is a
roundabout way to undermine citadels that cannot be stormed di-
rectly." 288 However, if tax expenditures are analogous to direct
expenditure programs, any programmatic concerns should be ad-
dressed directly and not surreptitiously, through the minimum
tax. Congress needs to ask questions appropriate to direct ex-
penditure programs: 1) Is the given program needed or desira-
ble?; 2) How should the program be designed?; and 3) Who
should benefit from the subsidy? 28 9 In particular, Congress must
be especially careful in examining who is benefitting from the
program. But when Congress is trying to induce certain taxpayer
behavior, it must recognize who is capable of that behavior.
Wealthy investors are the taxpayers who have the capital for risky
investments in low-income housing.
Thuronyi believes that the concept of substitutable tax provi-
sions should lead policy makers to treat tax and direct expendi-
ture programs alike for budget-making purposes. 290 Thus,
whenever Congress contemplates budget reductions, it should
subject tax expenditures to the same scrutiny as direct expendi-
ture programs. Although this is not happening formally, in some
cases tax and direct expenditure programs are being treated alike,
informally. For example, while tax expenditures were not subject
to the sequestration procedures of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
286. Id. at 276.
287. Michael J. Graetz & Emil M. Sunley, Minimum Taxes and Comprehensive
Tax Reform, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMP-
TION TAX 412 (1988) (recognizing that minimum tax has been used to mitigate
demands for repeal of tax expenditures).
288. Donald C. Lubick, Comments on M. Graetz and E. Sunley, Minimum Taxes
and Comprehensive Tax Reform, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID
INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 428-29 (1988).
289. McDaniel, supra note 229, at 275.
290. For a discussion of Thuronyi's concept of substitutable tax provisions,
see Thuronyi, supra note 277, at 1156.
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Act, 2 9 1 neither were many federal spending programs. 292 Ac-
counts exempt from sequestration cover about sixty-four percent
of all outlays.293 The major exemptions are social security, fed-
eral retirement and disability programs, certain low-income pro-
grams and net interest. Most of these exemptions are entitlement
programs. 294 Many, if not most of the tax expenditures are analo-
gous to entitlement programs in that if taxpayers are eligible, they
receive the benefits. The low-income housing credit program is
an important exception to this general rule because it is subject to
an unusual volume cap and thus more closely resembles discre-
tionary spending.
Moreover, the automatic sequestration process was never in-
tended to take effect. This explains the draconian formula of arbi-
trary across-the-board cuts on limited items. The Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act envisioned a continuing reliance on the
reconciliation process for deficit reduction in conjunction with
discretionary spending cuts through annual appropriation
bills. 295 And indeed, reconciliation bills have been used to cut
both entitlement spending and tax expenditures. The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1987, 1989, and 1990 have re-
pealed, modified or limited such tax expenditures as vacation pay
reserves, installment method of accounting for dealers, com-
pleted contract method of accounting, various itemized deduc-
tions and the ocean thermal energy tax credit. There is, however,
no formal recognition of the portion of the tax-writing commit-
291. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037.
292. Id. Known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, this Act created a
new budget procedure-sequestration. Id. Pursuant to this Act, if the President
and Congress did not reduce the deficit to the target deficit amount, then spend-
ing was cut in accordance with a preset formula. STANLEY COLLENDER, THE
GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET FISCAL 1988 50 (1987). All programs subject to
sequestration would be cut by the same across-the-board percentage. Id.
293. See ROBERT KEITH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SEQUESTRA-
TION ACTIONS FOR FY 1990 UNDER THE GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS ACT, CRS Is-
SUE BRIEF CRS-2 (1990).
294. Entitlement programs are direct expenditure programs that have no
spending limits and are available as entitlements to those who meet the statutory
criteria established for the programs. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D
CONG., IST SESS., METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING CHANGES IN THE Dis-
TRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS 2 (Comm. Print 1993).
295. STANLEY BACH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE SPENDING AND BUDGET PROCESS IN CONGRESS, CRS ISSUE BRIEF CRS-23
(1990) (stating that "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act envisioned a continuing reli-
ance on reconciliation as a means for Congress and the President to agree on
deficit reduction legislation as a preferred alternative to the automatic sequestra-
tion process it also created").
1993] 927
57
Kaye: Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tees' deficit reduction accomplished through cutbacks in tax ex-
penditures versus increased taxes.2 96 This leads to the notion
that when Congress reduces tax expenditures, taxes are in-
creased. This is simply not the case; this correlation is no more
true than when a direct expenditure is reduced.29 7
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA)298 complicated
matters even more. 299 For fiscal 1991-1993, the BEA separated
all discretionary spending into three categories-domestic, de-
fense and international-and established spending limits for each
one.30 0 Although the Act retained the sequestration process that
enforced the revised deficit targets in Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings,30 ' it also established sequestration procedures to enforce
the discretionary spending limits of each category and pay-as-you-
go requirements for mandatory spending and revenues. The pay-
as-you-go sequester system requires that any increases in direct
spending or decreases in revenues due to legislative action be off-
set by either an equal mandatory spending cut, revenue increase
or both so that there is no deficit effect. 30 2 Otherwise, a sequester
will be triggered. 30 3 Interestingly, discretionary spending in any
296. Regardless of whether a member of Congress considers the repeal or
the curtailment of tax expenditures as decreases in spending, the President's
annual budget contains a list of tax expenditures and the Joint Committee on
Taxation also prepares such a list. For an example of one such list, see FEDERAL
BUDGET FISCAL 1993, supra note 10, at 102-03. Thus, it would be relatively easy
to provide Congress with information regarding tax expenditure cuts during
budget debates.
297. McDaniel, supra note 229, at 274-75 ("[E]ffective rate analysis fosters
the erroneous impression that a tax increase is involved because ... a cutback in
tax expenditures would be reflected in higher effective tax rates.").
298. OBRA 1990 Title XIII, 104 Stat. at 1388-573.
299. Id.
300. FEDERAL BUDGET FISCAL 1993, supra note 10, at 13. Discretionary
spending is budgetary resources provided in appropriations acts. This means
that Congress and the President must enact legislation each year providing for
these funds to be spent. Id. at 6. Mandatory spending is budget authority pro-
vided by laws other than appropriations. This means that the funds will be ex-
pended even if Congress enacts no new legislation. Id. at 6-7. Mandatory
spending consists chiefly, but not exclusively, of entitlement programs. Id. at
36.
301. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets were revised by the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987. Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100- 119, 101 Stat. 754. Because of extensive changes by the BEA, however,
there is little chance of an excess-deficit type of sequester. FEDERAL BUDGET
FISCAL 1993, supra note 10, at 17, 28.
302. EDWARD DAVIS & ROBERT KEITH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1990: BRIEF SUMMARY, CRS ISSUE BRIEF CRS 2-5
(1990).
303. BEA retained all the entitlement exemptions that existed under
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of the three categories cannot be increased above the limits even
if paid for with increased revenues. Furthermore, through fiscal
1993, spending in one category cannot be reduced to pay for in-
creases in another category.30 4 This means that the tax-writing
committees again have the advantage of paying for a new social
program in the tax code with either tax increases or spending
cuts. Thus, tax expenditures analogous to entitlement programs
continue to be treated like exempt federal spending programs;
tax expenditures that more closely resemble discretionary spend-
ing, such as the low-income housing credit, continue their exemp-
tion from sequestration, unlike their spending counterparts.
Another problem is the lack of coordination among the tax-
writing committees and the relevant authorization and appropria-
tions committees with respect to the various spending programs
implemented through the tax code. This could be remedied by
having the Budget Committee serve as an ombudsman between
the various Committees during consideration of budget reconcili-
ation and appropriations bills, or formal coordinating councils
could be established where multiple committees pursue initiatives
in the same policy area. The Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs recommended the establishment of a
Tax and Housing Coordinating Council (consisting of the Secre-
taries of HUD, Treasury and Agriculture along with the Presi-
dent's Chief Domestic Policy Advisor) as part of the Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act. "The Committee
[believed] that low-income families would be better served at
lower overall cost if tax and spending incentives operated in tan-
dem to encourage the expansion of the supply of affordable
housing." 30 5
III. CONCLUSION
The view that the tax system is a poor vehicle for social policy
is probably the dominant opinion today among Treasury officials,
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, as amended. As a result, if a pay-as-you-go sequester
occurs, the cuts that can be made in mandatory programs are quite limited-
only about $26 billion in total. FEDERAL BUDGET FISCAL 1993, supra note 10, at
26.
304. Id. at 25. The discretionary caps (spending limits) will be merged into
a single category for fiscal 1994 and 1995 so that the appropriations committees
will again be able to shift funds among the various programs. Id. at 28.
305. S. REP. No. 316, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1990). Unfortunately, this
recommendation was not included in the National Affordable Housing Act as
enacted. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990).
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academic tax lawyers and tax economists. However, there are
many reasons the tax system is used for social programs-polit-
ical, historical, philosophical-as well as expediency, and the
targeted constituency. Almost annually, Congress and the Ad-
ministration use the tax system to encourage particular economic
or social activities and will continue to do so, particularly given
the budget process. Congress' passage of H.R. 2264 demon-
strates a continuing interest in utilizing the tax code to accom-
plish social policy by including tax expenditure provisions such as
empowerment zones, enterprise communities and other develop-
ment incentives. 30 6 Of course, it is always appropriate to analyze
whether program benefits should be provided through direct or
tax mechanisms but once the vehicle is chosen, it is important to
implement the social policy in the best way possible.
The grant of a below-market purchase option by investors to
nonprofit organizations in order to facilitate transfer of owner-
ship to those organizations dedicated to preserving the affordable
housing stock entails the forfeiture of one of the benefits of own-
ership, the right to appreciation. Tax law limits the availability of
tax benefits to one possessing sufficient ownership attributes of
the property, the true owner. Thus, housing policy is in conflict
with tax policy. However, there is statutory and administrative
precedent for allowing tax benefits independent of tax ownership.
Tax policy concerns should not frustrate congressional intent in
accomplishing housing policy objectives when Congress has
clearly enacted an incentive to induce certain taxpayer behavior
such as investment in low-income housing.
Encouraging investment in low-income housing entails at-
tracting capital from wealthy investors who can afford such a risky
investment. Some taxpayers perceive that the use of the low-in-
come housing credit by wealthy taxpayers to offset their taxes im-
pairs the equity of the tax code. The tax expenditure concept,
however, recognizes that the taxpayer has made an imputed tax
payment (computed in the absence of the special provision) and
received simultaneously a direct grant for making the desired in-
vestment. Tax policy analytic tools, such as effective tax rate anal-
ysis, need to be modified to incorporate tax expenditure theory.
Unless tax burden distribution tables are prepared in light of tax
expenditure analysis, misleading information will continue to
have a destructive impact on the legislative process.
306. OBRA 1993, 107 Stat. at 416-682.
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Tax expenditure analysis must also be more fully integrated
into the process so that tax policy concerns do not inappropri-
ately interfere with attempts to implement social policy. As long
as tax expenditures are treated properly for income measurement
purposes, the tax equity of the code is not jeopardized. The pas-
sive activity, general business credit and the alternative minimum
tax provisions are an inappropriate means of ensuring the equity
of the tax system with respect to the low-income housing credit.
Instead, the low-income housing credit should be adjusted and
made completely taxable through the basis reduction mechanism.
Tax expenditures need not be backdoor spending through the tax
system if recognized for what they are, another form of subsidy,
and subjected to the same analysis. Congress should evaluate
these tax expenditure programs based on direct expenditure cri-
teria-that is, whether they are necessary, properly designed and
benefitting the proper constituency.
Congress has affirmed its support of the low-income housing
credit program by permanently extending this credit in the 1993
Tax Act. As the tax system has been chosen as the vehicle for this
housing program, it is imperative to implement the desired hous-
ing policies properly.
1993]
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